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Acute gastroenteritis (AGE) outbreaks present a significant challenge to 
investigating public health officials, who need to know whether point source transmission 
— such as contaminated food, fomites, or highly infectious individuals — has occurred 
to respond effectively. However, information on the mode of transmission is frequently 
unavailable, especially during the early stages of an outbreak when control measures 
have the greatest impact. Clinical decision support systems (CDS) may be used to assist 
outbreak investigators when only limited data are available. This dissertation research 
investigated a) how the guidelines for norovirus outbreaks in healthcare settings vary 
between state public health agencies across the U.S., b) how mathematical modeling can 
be used to help outbreak investigators identify potential point source outbreaks, and c) 
how availability of outbreak information impacts public health decision-making. 
After introductory material in Chapters 1 and 2, Chapter 3 describes variation in 
norovirus outbreak guidelines and outcomes between states. Chapter 4 describes the 
development of a stochastic individual-level mathematical model for predicting whether 
an outbreak was likely caused by point source transmission. The model's internal and 
external validity were assessed, and the model was used to estimate potential 
misclassification in outbreaks reported to have been transmitted person-to-person. 
Chapter 5 describes semi-structured interviews with AGE epidemiologists about 
decision-making in hypothetical outbreak scenarios based on different levels of data 
iv 
availability, including results from a CDS based on the mathematical model. 
There was substantial variation in state healthcare-associated norovirus outbreak 
response guidelines, and there were differences between states with and without 
guidelines consistent with national guidance. The model performed well on measures of 
internal and external validity, and 73% of person-to-person norovirus outbreaks had at 
least some evidence of point source transmission. AGE epidemiologists drew different 
conclusions when presented with different levels of information, and there was evidence 
that CDS could help improve decision-making when only minimal data are available. 
These results demonstrate the need for CDS for transmission mode classification, the 
effectiveness of mathematical modeling for outbreak response decision support in some 
circumstances, and the potential for CDS to improve decision-making when data are 











ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................... iii 
 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................... viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................ x 
 
LIST OF ACRONYMS ................................................................................................... xiii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................. xiv 
 
Chapters 
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 
 
References ....................................................................................................................... 3 
2. BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................ 4 
 
Infectious Disease Outbreak Investigations .................................................................... 4 
Acute Gastroenteritis Outbreaks ..................................................................................... 5 
Publication of Guidance Relative to Public Health Jurisdictional Relationships ........... 7 
National Outbreak Reporting System ............................................................................. 9 
Mathematical Modeling and Clinical Profiles in Applied Public Health...................... 10 
References ..................................................................................................................... 21 
3. STATE-LEVEL ADOPTION OF NATIONAL GUIDELINES FOR NOROVIRUS 
OUTBREAKS IN HEALTHCARE SETTINGS .............................................................. 24 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 25 
Methods ......................................................................................................................... 27 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 31 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 38 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 42 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... 42 
References ..................................................................................................................... 51 
 
vii 
4. MATHEMATICAL MODELING TO SUPPORT TRANSMISSION MODE
CLASSIFICATION FOR ACUTE GASTROENTERITIS OUTBREAK RESPONSE
AND REPORTING .......................................................................................................... 56 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 56 
Methods ......................................................................................................................... 59 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 66 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 68 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 73 
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... 74 
References ..................................................................................................................... 80 
5. IMPACT OF DATA AVAILABILITY ON PUBLIC HEALTH DECISION-MAKING
DURING ACUTE GASTROENTERITIS OUTBREAKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
DECISION SUPPORT ..................................................................................................... 82 
Introduction ................................................................................................................... 82 
Methods ......................................................................................................................... 85 
Results ........................................................................................................................... 90 
Discussion ..................................................................................................................... 92 
Limitations .................................................................................................................... 93 
Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 95 
References ................................................................................................................... 103 
6. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................... 106 
Overview ..................................................................................................................... 106 
Uniqueness/Significance to Biomedical Informatics .................................................. 108 
Future Directions ......................................................................................................... 108 
References ................................................................................................................... 110 
APPENDIX: INTERVIEW TEXT ................................................................................. 111 
LIST OF TABLES 
Tables 
2.1. Investigation activities for epidemiology and environmental health staff during 
foodborne outbreaks associated with events or establishments (as recommended by 
the Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response)………………………….. 14 
2.2. National Outbreak Reporting System data fields, completeness, and distribution, 
2009-2011 (N = 6,877)……………………………………………………………. 15 
3.1. Numbers of states with public health recommendations aligned with CDC categories 
for prevention and control during acute gastroenteritis outbreaks in healthcare 
settings (N = 41 states with available guidelines)…………………………………. 44 
3.2. Numbers of states with recommendations for duration of patient isolation and staff 
exclusion (N = 41 states with available guidelines)…………….…………………. 45 
3.3. Recommendation categories found in at least 10 states’ guidelines for healthcare-
associated norovirus outbreak response (N = 41 states with available guidelines)… 46 
3.4. Description of norovirus outbreaks in healthcare settings reported to the National 
Outbreak Reporting System in 2015, stratified by features of norovirus outbreak 
response guidance collected from state health departments in 2016……………… 47 
4.1. List of mathematical model parameter values……………………………………… 75 
4.2. Availability of data by mode of transmission for acute gastroenteritis outbreaks 
reported to the National Outbreak Reporting System, 2009-2014………………… 76 
4.3. Mathematical model performance for person-to-person, environmental 
contamination, and indeterminate transmission mode outbreaks with and without 
documented evidence of likely point source transmission reported to the National 
Outbreak Reporting System during 2009-2014…………………………………… 77 
5.1. Characteristics of study participants (N = 9)……………………………………… 96 
5.2. Characteristics of acute gastroenteritis outbreak scenarios (N = 10)……………… 97 
ix 
5.3. Odds ratios (OR) for participant-predicted pathogen, mode of transmission, and 
response by level of information availability (N = 90 for each)…………………… 98 
5.4. Odds ratios (OR) for accuracy of participant-selected pathogen, mode of 
transmission, and response compared to reported epidemiologic findings and 
mathematical model predictions by level of information availability (N = 90 for 
each)………………………………………………………………………………… 99 
A.1. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=8346)…………………………………………… 113 
A.2. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=8276)…………………………………………… 116 
A.3. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=4158)…………………………………………… 119 
A.4. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=7020)…………………………………………… 122 
A.5. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=1722)…………………………………………… 125 
A.6. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=6041)…………………………………………… 128 
A.7. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=5438)…………………………………………… 131 
A.8. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=4474)…………………………………………… 134 
A.9. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=5897)…………………………………………… 137 
A.10. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=1919)……………………………………………140 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figures 
2.1. High-level processes associated with investigating an acute gastroenteritis 
outbreak……………………………………………………………………………...19 
2.2. Types of acute gastroenteritis outbreaks and typical public health response (based on 
national guidelines and surveillance reports)………………………………………..20 
3.1. Percent of outbreaks with confirmed etiology reported to the National Outbreak 
Reporting System in 2015 by recommended ranges for stool specimen collection 
obtained from state health departments in 2016 (diamonds indicate range medians; 
arrows indicate ranges with no upper bounds) (N = 16 states with available outbreak 
data). Correlation coefficient = 0.71 (p = 0.004) for stool specimen range midpoints 
and percent of outbreaks with confirmed etiology (N = 14)………………………. 50 
4.1. Description of nonwaterborne outbreaks from the National Outbreak Reporting 
System included in the analysis…………………………………………………… 78 
4.2. Sensitivity of a mathematical model for detecting artificially introduced super-
spreader transmission events that were 2, 4, and 6 times the basic reproduction 
number of 1.64 associated with person-to-person transmission of norovirus for 6,330 
acute gastroenteritis outbreaks reported to the National Outbreak Reporting System 
(NORS) during 2009-2014.………………………………………………………… 79 
5.1. Interview questions………………………………………………………………. 101 
5.2. Example of decision support system results (additional background information is 
available in the Appendix)………………………………………………………… 102 
A.1. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=8346)………………………………………………. 113 
A.2. Epidemic Curve (Scenario ID=8346)……………………………………………. 114 
A.3. Clinical Decision Support Results (Scenario ID=8346)…………………………. 115 
A.4. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=8276)………………………………………………. 116 
xi 
A.5. Epidemic Curve (Scenario ID=8276)……………………………………………. 117 
A.6. Clinical Decision Support Results (Scenario ID=8276)…………………………. 118 
A.7. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=4158)………………………………………………. 119 
A.8. Epidemic Curve (Scenario ID=4158)……………………………………………. 120 
A.9. Clinical Decision Support Results (Scenario ID=4158)…………………………. 121 
A.10. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=7020)……………………………………………….122 
A.11. Epidemic Curve (Scenario ID=7020)…………………………………………….123 
A.12. Clinical Decision Support Results (Scenario ID=7020)………………………….124 
A.13. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=1722)……………………………………………….125 
A.14. Epidemic Curve (Scenario ID=1722)…………………………………………….126 
A.15. Clinical Decision Support Results (Scenario ID=1722)………………………….127 
A.16. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=6041)……………………………………………….128 
A.17. Epidemic Curve (Scenario ID=6041)…………………………………………….129 
A.18. Clinical Decision Support Results (Scenario ID=6041)………………………….130 
A.19. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=5438)……………………………………………….131 
A.20. Epidemic Curve (Scenario ID=5438)…………………………………………….132 
A.21. Clinical Decision Support Results (Scenario ID=5438)………………………….133 
A.22. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=4474)……………………………………………….134 
A.23. Epidemic Curve (Scenario ID=4474)…………………………………………….135 
A.24. Clinical Decision Support Results (Scenario ID=4474)………………………….136 
A.25. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=5897)……………………………………………….137 
A.26. Epidemic Curve (Scenario ID=5897)…………………………………………….138 
A.27. Clinical Decision Support Results (Scenario ID=5897)………………………….139 
xii 
A.28. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=1919)……………………………………………….140 
A.29. Epidemic Curve (Scenario ID=1919)…………………………………………….141 
A.30. Clinical Decision Support Results (Scenario ID=1919)………………………….142 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AGE Acute gastroenteritis 
AIC Akaike Information Criterion 
CDC Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
CDS Clinical Decision Support 
CI Confidence Interval 
CIFOR Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response 
EH Environmental Health 
EHA Environmental Health Assessment 
GLMM Generalized Linear Mixed Effects Model 
HICPAC Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee 
LHD Local Health Department 
NACCHO National Association of City and County Health Officials 
NORS National Outbreak Reporting System 
OR Odds Ratio 





I would like to thank my committee for their ongoing support and persistent 
commitment of time and energy: Scott Evans, MS, PhD; Catherine Staes, BSN, MPH, 
PhD; Kensaku Kawamoto, MD, PhD, MHS; Matt Samore, MD; and Fred Adler, PhD. 
I'd like to thank my employers at Salt Lake County Health Department, Utah 
Department of Health, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), whose 
understanding and support regarding my education have been essential and are 
immensely appreciated.  
I am grateful for the applied epidemiologists from four local health departments 
and 25 state health departments whose willing participation and contributions made each 
phase of this research possible. Support from the NORS team at CDC, including 
manuscript review by Dr. Aron Hall and Mary Wikswo, was also helpful and 
appreciated. 
Above all, I would like to thank my family, especially my wife, Chelsea, and my 
children, Geryn, Elsie, Gavin, Dagan, and Beau, for their encouragement and patience 












During acute gastroenteritis (AGE) outbreaks, information about the pathogen and 
route of transmission is essential to implement effective public health control measures to 
end an outbreak as soon as possible.
1
 However, this information is frequently 
unavailable, especially during the early stages of an outbreak when appropriate control 
measures have the greatest impact.
2
 Most acute gastroenteritis outbreaks are attributable 
to person-to-person transmission of norovirus,
3
 which may require very different control 
measures than other pathogens or modes of transmission.
4
 Mathematical modeling may 
be used to determine whether the data that are usually available during an outbreak are 
consistent with person-to-person transmission of norovirus and thence to determine the 
most appropriate response. 
For such a mathematical model to be effective, several issues needed to be 
addressed. First, the processes whereby acute gastroenteritis outbreaks are investigated 
needed to be understood, with possible variations between jurisdictions identified and 
accounted for to assure the applicability and portability of a proposed model. Second, a 
model needed to be developed and tested on real-world data to determine its reliability 





developed and tested in a real-world setting to evaluate its effectiveness in practice.  
To these ends, the aims for this PhD research were as follows: 
Aim 1. Determine how guidelines for norovirus outbreaks in healthcare facilities 
vary between states and how differences between states are associated with 
outbreak outcomes; 
Aim 2. Develop and validate a mathematical model approach that effectively 
determines whether outbreaks of acute gastroenteritis are consistent with person-
to-person transmission of norovirus based on data available during the early 
stages of outbreaks; 
Aim 3. Investigate how public health epidemiologists make decisions during 
AGE outbreak investigations and have them review hypothetical outbreak 
scenarios to assess how different levels of data availability would affect their 
decision-making. 
The completion of these aims is intended to provide public health practitioners in 
varied locations and levels of government with a means of more effectively deploying 
resources during acute gastroenteritis outbreaks, increasing efficiency and potentially 
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Infectious Disease Outbreak Investigations 
During an infectious disease outbreak, investigation is usually undertaken by the 
local health department (LHD) in the community where the outbreak has occurred. 
During these investigations, obtaining information about the pathogen and route of 
transmission (Figure 2.1) is essential to implement effective public health control 
measures to end the outbreak as soon as possible.
1
 For example, an onsite environmental 
health assessment of a long-term care facility kitchen might be an appropriate response 
during an outbreak suspected to be foodborne, but may not be necessary for an outbreak 
transmitted person-to-person.
2
 When the specific outbreak etiology is unknown, 
investigation and intervention decisions can be made using information derived from the 
reported cases (e.g., incubation periods and incidence trends) to predict the etiology.
3
 
However, this information is frequently unavailable during infectious disease outbreaks, 
especially during the early stages when appropriate control measures have the greatest 
impact.
4
 Over half of all outbreaks reported to public health officials are never confirmed 
to have been caused by a specific agent.
5
 While guidance on outbreak response has been 
provided by the CDC
1
 and other organizations,
2





make decisions about investigation and control measures in the absence of adequate data. 
It is common practice for public health epidemiologists to rely on intuition and/or 
previous experience to make decisions in such circumstances. Table 2.1 lists typical 
investigation activities for outbreaks that are suspected to be foodborne as described by 
the Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR).
2
 Recommended control 
measures and the involvement of environmental health staff may differ for outbreaks that 
are not suspected to be foodborne, but other aspects of the investigation would be similar. 
 
Acute Gastroenteritis Outbreaks 
Norovirus is the most common cause of acute gastroenteritis in the U.S.
5
 Each 
year, norovirus causes an average of 19-21 million cases of acute gastroenteritis, 1.7-1.9 
million outpatient visits, 400,000 emergency department visits, 56,000-71,000 
hospitalizations, and 570-800 deaths, and is responsible for nearly 1 million pediatric 
medical care visits and about 50% of foodborne disease outbreaks.
6
 Each year, it costs 
about $2 billion in the U.S. for healthcare and lost productivity from foodborne illness 
caused by norovirus,
7
 and it follows that the total burden when nonfoodborne illness is 
included would be substantially greater. 
Most acute gastroenteritis (AGE) outbreaks are caused by person-to-person 
transmission of norovirus
5
 which is also the most common cause of gastroenteritis 
outbreaks with laboratory confirmed etiologies.
5
 Different control measures are 
recommended depending on the pathogen and mode of transmission (Figure 2.2),
2,5,8
 but 
the pathogen and mode of transmission are frequently never confirmed.
5
 Current 





remains unknown to determine whether the causal pathogen may be norovirus.
8
 Several 
studies have shown that norovirus can be distinguished from other enteric pathogens by 
clinical attributes such as the incubation period and duration of illness.
4,9-11
  
According to the CDC’s most recent National Outbreak Reporting System 
(NORS) report,
5
 only half (48.8%) of reported gastroenteritis outbreaks in 2009-2010 
were confirmed to have been caused by specific agents. Of the outbreaks with a 
confirmed agent, 64.2% were caused by norovirus. Two-thirds (66.1%) of these 
norovirus outbreaks had a mode of transmission that was person-to-person. Among 
confirmed norovirus outbreaks that occurred in a single setting, 63.7% were in healthcare 
facilities. The health department’s role in investigating outbreaks in healthcare settings 
may be limited to collecting information and providing education,
8
 activities which can 
typically be completed by telephone. Foodborne outbreaks of norovirus or other 
pathogens usually require a visit to the affected facility to verify proper food handling 
practices are in place and to enable the determination of the source and distribution 
(traceback) of any implicated food items.
2
 Since the majority of gastrointestinal outbreaks 
are caused by person-to-person transmission of norovirus where onsite visits by public 
health authorities may not be needed, it would likely not be cost-effective for a health 
department to do an onsite visit during each outbreak of unknown etiology. However, 
failing to complete an onsite visit for outbreaks that are potentially foodborne allows 
lapses in food handling practices to persist and contaminated food items to continue to be 
distributed, potentially infecting many more people. Therefore, it is important to have a 
strategy for identifying and implementing the more intensive investigation and control 





transmission of norovirus. 
One solution to the problem is to increase laboratory testing, an approach that has 
been supported by the CDC in its CaliciNet program. CaliciNet provides laboratory 
support to states without in-house capacity for norovirus strain typing.
12
 Currently, 
however, only about half of state public health laboratories are certified to participate,
13
 
so it can take several days for many health departments to get results. Since the average 
norovirus outbreak lasts about one week,
8
 there may be little incentive for local health 
departments to expend time and resources to collect and submit additional specimens for 
testing. This situation may change with improved laboratory tests and techniques,
8
 but 
there are also ethical concerns. The CDC promotes increased laboratory testing in their 
outbreak response guidelines, recommending that five stool specimens should be 
collected to confirm a diagnosis of norovirus,
8,14
 but most persons with norovirus 
infection recover within three days
8
 without needing to receive medical care. Requiring 
the collection of stool specimens from ill persons who may not derive any clinical benefit 
from the testing may be unduly burdensome, especially when it is unlikely the test results 
will be returned in time for public health officials to change their response. 
 
Publication of Guidance Relative to Public Health Jurisdictional Relationships 
The availability of guidelines for responding to acute gastroenteritis outbreaks is 
an important factor that influences how outbreak investigators make decisions on 
investigation and control measures. Though the CDC has published its own guidelines for 
responding to AGE outbreaks in healthcare settings,
15
 many state and local health 





CDC’s recommendations. In addition to the 50 state departments of health, the National 
Association of County & City Health Officials (NACCHO) identified 2,532 LHDs in the 
U.S., with 1,943 being locally governed, 402 being subunits of the state health agency, 
and 187 having shared governance between local and state jurisdictions.
16
 If one assumes 
the shared or substate jurisdictions use the same guidelines as those developed by their 
respective states, then there may be as many as 1,993 different guidelines in place for 
responding to AGE outbreaks. 
However, since the majority of LHDs (71%) serve populations of fewer than 
50,000
16
 (who would expect to have at most one AGE outbreak reported annually
2
), it is 
likely that most of these independent jurisdictions have not developed their own 
guidelines, as evidenced by their low participation in the development of local policy in 
general (28%).
16
 Furthermore, those that do develop their own policies tend to have 
closer relationships with state agencies (47% of LHDs in jurisdictions with shared 
governance reported having local policy development).
16
 Much of the variation between 
guidelines nationally is thus likely reflected in the state-level guidelines. 
Variation in AGE guidelines between states may be due to attempts to simplify or 
add detail to CDC’s guidelines (for example, identifying an outbreak based on "two or 
more cases" in Oregon
17
 or "at least 3 patients/residents" in New Mexico
18
 instead of 
using Kaplan’s Criteria). Local laws and practices may also influence state guidelines 
(for example, norovirus is a reportable disease in Massachusetts
19
 but not in Texas
20
). 
These state-specific guidelines have the potential to impact outbreak detection rates and 
outcomes and should be thoroughly evaluated. They are likely to have a significant 





jurisdictions, which will impact healthcare facilities in those states. Since the majority of 
AGE outbreaks are caused by norovirus, and most norovirus outbreaks occur in 
healthcare facilities, it is important to understand what these state-specific guidelines are, 
and how they differ between states. 
 
National Outbreak Reporting System 
The National Outbreak Reporting System has served as a national repository of 
AGE outbreak data since February 2009. All local, state, and territorial health 
departments are encouraged to report all AGE outbreaks, which have been defined by 
NORS as 2 or more cases of a similar illness epidemiologically linked to a common 
exposure, to the system through an online portal.
5
 There are four required fields for 
reporting an outbreak to NORS: primary mode of transmission, date first case became ill, 
reporting state, and estimated total number of primary cases. However, health 
departments are also encouraged to report detailed information on other elements, 
including the setting, contributing factors, implicated food vehicles, and traceback 
investigations.
21
 Though mode of transmission is required, the determination is based 
largely on the findings of the investigation and may be subject to error. For example, the 
guidelines specify that transmission should be considered person-to-person "if most of 
the cases had known direct contact or likely had the opportunity for direct contact with 
one another." This definition allows room for interpretation, and if a common food or 
environmental source is not clearly identified, outbreaks may be misclassified. Before 
NORS was initiated in 2009, only foodborne outbreaks were reported to the CDC. A 





modes of transmission became available, suggesting that some outbreaks had previously 
been incorrectly classified as foodborne. This past misclassification shows the potential 
for continuing misclassification, but the inclusion of additional modes of transmission in 




Etiology determinations in NORS are based on gold standard laboratory testing, 
and other data fields are entered directly from reports prepared by the investigating health 
departments. However, characteristics of the NORS system may impact the quality of 
data collected about AGE outbreaks. While it is true that some data may be missing from 
NORS simply due to health departments’ failure to report fields that are not required by 
the CDC, many health departments do enter complete outbreak data, and there are 
enough data available for determinations to be made about which elements can feasibly 
be collected in practice. The restriction of NORS data to those fields selected for 
inclusion by the CDC is an important limitation. Identifying other potentially important 
fields that may need to be included in NORS is a subject for future research. Despite the 
limitations of the data, NORS remains a rich source of information on AGE outbreaks in 
the U.S. A summary of data fields and availability in NORS from 2009-2011 is included 
in Table 2.2. 
 
Mathematical Modeling and Clinical Profiles in Applied Public Health 
Mathematical modeling is an analytical process whereby "population parameters 
are described by symbols and linked by algebraic formulae" to "provide a realistic 
representation of the real world."
23








Mathematical models have been widely used for determining optimal control 




 Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome (SARS),
27
 and many other agents.
28-30
 However, such studies appear to 
primarily address control measures that are to be implemented for known infectious 
agents during large-scale pandemics. Control measures for smaller, local outbreaks, 
which health departments are likely to face much more frequently than pandemics and 
where the infectious agent may not be known, are not well represented in the literature. 
The structure of a model is dependent on the nature of the pathogen and 
population being modeled. For example, a Susceptible-Exposed-Infective-Recovered 
(SEIR) model might be appropriate for diseases that are only infectious following an 
incubation period. Other traditional epidemic models include the Susceptible-Infective-
Recovered (SIR) and Susceptible-Infective-Susceptible (SIS) models. The results of such 
a model may be used to distinguish between the different types of outbreaks when the 
data necessary for more sophisticated analyses are unavailable. This approach is 
applicable to all outbreaks of infectious disease where the etiology is unknown. However, 
this dissertation is focused on outbreaks caused by enteric pathogens. 
Several researchers have successfully used various techniques to categorize 
gastroenteritis outbreaks based on clinical presentation.
4,9-11
 Kaplan’s Criteria, which has 
been found to be relatively sensitive (68%) with a remarkably high specificity (99%),
4
 
has been recommended for use by the CDC in investigating outbreaks of unknown 
etiology.
3
 Other techniques have also performed well, with attribution of outbreaks of 











techniques being used in applied practice was readily found in the literature. Furthermore, 
each of these methods was applied to subsets of data containing information that a health 
department may not often have readily available at any point during many outbreaks. The 
reasons for missing data are unknown and likely vary widely due to the diversity of 
jurisdictions represented, but may include problems such as insufficient resources to 
collect data or the difficulty in estimating the incubation period in person-to-person 
outbreaks. Kaplan’s Criteria, for example, which requires information about the 
percentage of cases that vomited, the mean incubation period, and the mean duration of 
illness, has been found to be useable in only 37% of outbreaks of unknown etiology.
4
 
The success of techniques that use clinical profiles for norovirus attribution 
suggests that the parameters for a mathematical model for person-to-person transmission 
of norovirus (such as incubation period and duration of illness) can be expected to be 
relatively consistent between populations, allowing the potential for them to be assumed 
beforehand instead of collected as part of an investigation. Such assumptions would 
enable a model to be run using only such basic preliminary information as the current 
number of cases, size of the at-risk population, and the number of days since the first 
onset of illness – typically among the first items of information obtained during an 
outbreak investigation. Such a mathematical model should be able to predict with 
reasonable confidence whether the number of outbreak cases over time is consistent with 
person-to-person transmission of norovirus, with sensitivity and specificity approaching 
that of clinical profile-based approaches, but only requiring data that are available most 
or all of the time. However, even with high measures of validity, the willingness of public 





with adequate measures of usability must also be developed and evaluated for the 






Table 2.1. Investigation activities for epidemiology and environmental health staff 
during foodborne outbreaks associated with events or establishments (as 




Objective Epidemiology Staff Environmental Health Staff 
Identify 
etiologic agent 
Contact healthcare providers of 
cases; interview cases to 
characterize symptoms, 
incubation period, and duration 
of illness; obtain stool from 
cases; establish case definition 
based on confirmed diagnosis 
or clinical profile 
Interview management/food 
workers; obtain stool; obtain 
samples of implicated and 
suspected food; determine whether 
setting or food suggests a likely 
pathogen 
Identify 
persons at risk 
Obtain from event organizer a 
list of persons attending 
event/patronizing 
establishment; Interview 
persons to determine attack 
rates, by time 
Obtain lists of reservations for 
establishment, receipts, inventory 





Interview cases and controls or 
well meal companions about all 
common exposure sources and 
calculate odds ratios; interview 
persons with identified 
exposures and determine attack 
rates and relative risks 
Obtain menu; interview food 
workers to determine food-
preparation responsibilities; 
reconstruct food flow for 
implicated food; identify 
contributing factors; obtain samples 





Combine descriptive and 
analytical epidemiology results 
Evaluate food flow for implicated 
food; if no contamination event 
identified, trace source ingredients 




Summarize information to 
identify confirmed or suspected 
agent/confirmed or suspected 
food vehicle 
Evaluate results of environmental 
investigation, given identification 
of agent and results of 






and need for 
abatement 
procedures 
Create epidemic curve and 
evaluate to determine whether 
additional cases may still be 
occurring; review potential 
abatement procedures 
Implement control measures to 
prevent further exposures: verify 
food workers excluded, verify 
contaminated foods disposed, very 
surfaces cleaned and sanitized, train 
staff; if measures cannot be 










Table 2.2. National Outbreak Reporting System data fields, completeness, and 




Complete Low Value High Value Description 










DateFirstIll 100.0 1/1/2009 12/31/2011 
Date of first 
onset 
DateLastIll 87.6 1/1/2009 9/4/2013 
Date of last 
onset 
ReportingState 100.0 Alabama Wyoming Reporting state 






















cramps Weight loss 
Name of 
symptom 











Table 2.2 continued. 
Field Name 
% 
Complete Low Value High Value Description 
SymptomInfo 73.1 0 528 
Number of 
cases for whom 
















TotalSecondary 26.1 0 299 
Total number of 
secondary cases 
TotalCases 100.0 2 1939 
Total number of 
cases 




SpecimensTaken 94.9 No (21.1%) Yes (11.3%) 
































Table 2.2 continued. 
Field Name 
% 
Complete Low Value High Value Description 








Confirmed 100.0 No (16.0%) Yes (49.1%) 
Etiology is 
confirmed 







PatientSpecimen 94.7 No (6.1%) Yes (53.6%) 
Etiology was 
detected in a 
patient 
specimen 
FoodSpecimen 94.7 No (56.6%) Yes (3.2%) 
Etiology was 
detected in a 
food specimen 
EnvironmentSpecimen 94.7 No (59.0%) Yes (0.8%) 
Etiology was 
detected in an 
environmental 
specimen 
FoodWorkerSpecimen 94.7 No (57.0%) Yes (2.8%) 
Etiology was 
detected in a 
food worker 
specimen 











GuestExposed 32.1 0 266,944 
Number of 
guests exposed 
StaffExposed 21.9 0 4,000 
Number of staff 
exposed 
GuestIll 38.6 0 742 
Number of 
guests ill 
StaffIll 31.0 0 181 












Table 2.2 continued. 
Field Name 
% 
Complete Low Value High Value Description 
GuestAR 32.0 0 100 
Guest attack 
rate 

































































Figure 2.2. Types of acute gastroenteritis outbreaks and typical public health 
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OUTBREAKS IN HEALTHCARE SETTINGS 
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In the U.S., there is growing interest in nationally interoperable public health 
informatics undertakings that work across sectors and jurisdictional boundaries, such as 
electronic case reporting
1
 and Public Health 3.0.
2
 However, public health remains largely 
local and fragmented, with policies and information systems often developed for a single 
state or local jurisdiction.
2
 Understanding existing guidelines and expectations currently 
applied in jurisdictions across the country is an important first step toward such ambitious 
development projects. 
Clinical decision support (CDS) systems can help investigating officials follow 
best practices when responding to infectious disease outbreaks,
3
 but variation in local 
guidelines would make such systems difficult to develop and implement. It was our 
efforts to develop such a system for acute gastroenteritis outbreak response and the 
impact of variation in guidelines for norovirus in healthcare settings on our approach that 
led to the present study. In 2011, the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory 
Committee (HICPAC) published guidelines concerning norovirus outbreaks in healthcare 
settings
4
 (hereinafter referred to as "the HICPAC guidelines"). These guidelines gave 
detailed recommendations for prevention and control of norovirus and similar acute 
gastroenteritis (AGE) outbreaks in healthcare settings based on the existing literature and 
other evidence. Noroviruses are responsible for at least 50% of AGE outbreaks 
worldwide, causing approximately 20 million illnesses each year.
5
 Local or state health 
departments investigate outbreaks to institute interventions and prevent future outbreaks. 
The results are reported to CDC’s National Outbreak Reporting System (NORS), an 





outbreaks caused by contact with infected persons, animals, or environmental sources, 
and AGE outbreaks caused by other or unknown modes of transmission.
6 
Many state and local jurisdictions had released their own guidelines prior to the 
HICPAC guidelines, and most have since published or updated their own norovirus or 
general AGE outbreak guidelines with recommendations tailored to the perceived needs 
of their individual jurisdictions. Healthcare facilities are the most common setting of 
reported AGE outbreaks,
6
 and most of these guidelines are specific to the management of 
outbreaks in such settings. This emphasis on healthcare-associated AGE outbreaks can 
also be explained by the vulnerable populations that reside in such settings, the potential 
for successful interventions, and the regulatory relationships that exist between public 
health entities and healthcare facilities in many states. The guidelines may also include 
guidance on investigation activities (e.g., when to conduct environmental health 
assessments), administrative details (e.g., how local health departments should report 
findings to the state), regulatory requirements (e.g., when to close a healthcare facility's 
food services), or any other topics deemed by a state to be important to outbreak 
response. 
Beyond their use by a state health department, state guidelines may also be used 
by local health departments or healthcare facilities or adapted when these entities create 
their own guidelines. Failure to adopt national guidelines could result in the use of 
ineffective strategies for outbreak response and lead to disparities in outbreak data 
collection and reporting between jurisdictions. The objectives of this study were a) to 
identify the extent to which state-level guidelines adhere to national guidelines for 





differences in guidelines may impact the information about outbreaks reported to NORS. 
The impact of such differences is currently unknown. A better understanding of the 
potential relationships between guidance and outbreak outcomes would improve the 
interpretability of national outbreak data, potentially lead to improved guidelines, and 
encourage development of CDS.  
 
Methods 
Guidelines Collection and Verification 
In February 2016, internet searches for norovirus guidelines in each of the 50 U.S. 
states were conducted using Google Search. Search terms included the individual names 
of states combined with "state norovirus guidelines." The first 20 search results were 
reviewed, and state health department documents addressing norovirus or AGE outbreak 
response were collected. Next, state epidemiology, infectious disease, and/or healthcare-
associated infections pages were navigated manually from each state health department 
website and inspected for AGE guidelines. If search functionality was available on a 
state’s website, then the search terms "norovirus" and "gastroenteritis" were used and 
results that addressed norovirus or AGE outbreak response in the first 20 search results 
were inspected. Since guidelines designed to address AGE outbreaks in general were not 
distinguished from guidelines specific to norovirus, we will refer to "AGE outbreaks" 
unless specifically referring to individual guidelines or outbreaks solely related to 
norovirus. 
To verify that the guidelines identified were current and the preferred guidance 





and web form addresses was created by manually searching the state health departments' 
epidemiology, infectious disease, and/or healthcare-associated infections web pages for 
contact information. For states where the email or web form addresses at the department 
level could not be found, higher levels of electronic contact information were sought 
using websites' navigation trees up to the main health department level. A standard letter 
requesting verification of online guidelines and copies of any other guidelines was sent 
via email or web form to the 45 states for which addresses were obtained in June 2016. 
States were provided four weeks to respond. Once all internet searches were completed 
and all state responses collected, available guidelines were reviewed and restricted to 




Guidelines Review and Tabulation 
 The HICPAC guidelines for norovirus outbreaks in healthcare settings include 12 
recommendation topics
4
 and were used as a template for comparison. Additional topics 
were included if a new recommendation occurred in at least 10 state-based guidelines. 
When analyzing the states’ guidelines, general recommendations that fell under one of 
the HICPAC guidelines’ recommendation topics (e.g., increased hand hygiene and 
patient cohorting) were grouped broadly under the associated HICPAC-defined topic, 
while recommendations found only in state guidelines were analyzed in greater detail. 
Quantitative recommendations, such as the number of stool specimens to be collected or 
the time range for patient isolation, were grouped based on the specific ranges indicated. 
Variations between states for each of these recommendations were summarized, and 






Data about outbreaks reported to NORS in 2015 (dates of first onset between 
January 1 and December 31, 2015) that were attributed at least in part to laboratory-
confirmed or suspected norovirus in healthcare facilities were used to assess the potential 
impact of variation in guidelines between states. The year 2015 was the most recent year 
for which data were available. An outbreak was considered healthcare-associated if it was 
reported as occurring at least in part in one of the following settings (based on where the 
food was eaten for foodborne outbreaks): hospitals, long-term care facilities, such as 
nursing homes and assisted living facilities, and other healthcare facilities.
55
 
Outbreak-related elements in the NORS data were stratified using the following 
criteria from the states’ guidelines: 
 number of specimens: a) median below five (five is the HICPAC 
recommendation
56
) (e.g., "1-3 specimens"), b) median at or above five 
(including ranges with no upper bound), or c) no guidance or unspecified 
number (e.g., "Collect specimens within 48-72 hours");  
 outbreak detection: a) two or more epidemiologically-linked cases 
occurring within a specified time frame (NORS definition
57
), b) three or 
more epidemiologically-linked cases, "more than expected" case counts, 
or outbreaks based on unspecified suspicion; c) no guidance; 
 ill patient isolation: a) minimum of two days (HICPAC recommendation4), 
b) less than two days; c) no guidance; 
 ill employee exclusion: minimum of two days (HICPAC 
recommendation
4





 outbreak resolution: a) two incubation periods or more (a standard time 
frame in applied epidemiology used to identify transmission from 
subclinical infections or unrecognized cases
58
), b) less than two incubation 
periods, or c) no guidance; 
 mode of transmission:  a) any guidance, or b) no guidance; 
 environmental health assessments: a) any guidance, or b) no guidance). 
Descriptive statistics were reported and used to compare outbreak outcomes in states with 
different guidelines. Categories were combined or comparisons were not made if 
recommendation categories were in fewer than five states’ guidelines. Rate ratios were 
used to compare rates between states. Two-proportion Z-tests and two-sample t-tests were 
used to compare states with reference recommendations (those consistent with the 
HICPAC guidelines or otherwise representing model practice) to states with other 
recommendations. The impact of differences in recommendations for stool specimen 
collection was assessed by comparing the percentages of outbreaks with confirmed 
etiology (as indicated in NORS) between states. For ill patient isolation and ill employee 
exclusion, the average outbreak duration and the average number of cases per outbreak 
were compared. For outbreak detection, the number of outbreaks per 100,000 people 
using state population estimates from the 2015 American Community Survey
59
 and the 
average number of cases per outbreak were compared. For outbreak resolution, the 
average outbreak duration and the average number of cases per outbreak were compared. 
Average outbreak duration only included outbreaks for which the first and last onset 
dates were available (i.e., outbreaks with missing dates were excluded). Average number 





was defined as four days for this analysis. For states with and without guidelines on 
determining the mode of transmission and when to conduct environmental health 
assessments, the percentages of outbreaks attributed to "Indeterminate/Other/Unknown" 
transmission were compared. 
 
Human Participant Compliance Statement 
The Institutional Review Board at the University of Utah reviewed the procedures 




State-based guidelines specific to AGE outbreak response in healthcare settings 
were identified for 41 states. Four states reported they had no guidelines, and five states 
did not respond to our queries or have guidelines available on their websites. Of the 50 
U.S. states, 38 (76%) were found to have online guidelines available through the 
attempted internet searches. Email or web form contact information were readily 
available for 45 states, and public health officials from 25 of these states responded to 
queries for guidelines, for a response rate of 56%. Altogether, 12 responding states 
provided additional or current documents, nine verified existing online resources, and 
four reported they had no available guidelines. Of the 20 states that did not respond to 
queries, 15 had guidelines specific to AGE outbreak response in healthcare settings 
available on their websites, and 5 did not. The five states for which no electronic contact 





a total of 41 states with guidelines available for analysis. These guidelines were dated 
from 2001 to 2016, with a median year of 2013. Four states had undated guidelines. 
Guidelines in states that responded to queries had date ranges that were slightly more 
recent (2006-2016, median 2014) than those of nonresponding states (2001-2016, median 
2012). 
The 12 prevention and control measures identified in the HICPAC guidelines, 
together with additional guidance concerning outbreak detection, outbreak resolution, 
mode of transmission, and environmental health assessments, were including in 10 or 
more states’ guidelines and thus met the threshold for further analysis. These categories 
are detailed below. The following guideline elements were identified in fewer than 10 
states’ guidelines and thus did not meet the threshold to be included for this analysis: 
outbreak confirmation, events warranting additional public health notification, additional 
documents, and other content. 
 
Prevention and Control 
The state guidelines generally followed the HICPAC guidelines with regard to 
recommendations on prevention and control. Coverage ranged from 71% having 
recommendations related to patient transfer and ward closure to 100% having 
recommendations regarding hand hygiene and staff leave and policy (see Table 3.1). 
However, even within these well-established categories there was considerable variation 
between states. For example, HICPAC recommends that ill residents be isolated and ill 
staff excluded until at least two days after their symptoms resolve. However, the 27 





hours after resolution, with five different recommended time frames within that range. 
Similarly, the 40 state recommendations concerning ill employee exclusion ranged from 
allowing employees to return immediately after symptom resolution to 72 hours after 
resolution, with six different recommended time frames within that range (see Tables 3.2 
and 3.3). 
The HICPAC guidelines on norovirus outbreaks in healthcare settings refrain 
from giving specific guidance on the number of stool specimens to collect during an 
outbreak, instead directing healthcare facilities to consult with their state or local public 
health authorities. However, in the "Updated Norovirus Outbreak Management and 
Disease Prevention Guidelines," CDC recommends that stool specimens be collected 
from at least five ill persons during norovirus outbreak investigations.
56
 In contrast, of the 
36 states giving guidance on the number of stool specimens to collect, only two 
recommended consulting with public health officials, two mentioned only that stool 
specimens should be collected, and the remaining 32 states gave 21 different 
recommended ranges, with ranges beginning or ending on almost every integer from 1 to 
12 (see Figure 3.1).  
 
Outbreak Detection 
At least 11 different outbreak definitions were recommended for outbreak 
detection in 40 (98%) states’ guidelines (see Table 3.3). Only one state (2%) did not 
provide guidance on outbreak detection. The HICPAC guidelines recommend using 
clinical laboratory diagnostics or Kaplan's Criteria
60
 to identify the likely etiology of an 





occurred. However, NORS defines an outbreak as "two or more cases of similar illness 
associated with a common exposure,"
57
 and 15 states adopted a definition for AGE 
outbreaks similar to the NORS definition. There was still variation in how different states 
defined the linkage between cases — for example, whether the cases had to occur within 
one, two, or three days, or just be otherwise "epidemiologically linked"— but all 15 
guidelines required associations in place, time, or common exposure between at least two 
cases. The other 25 states defined outbreaks more liberally as a) three or more cases, b) 
more cases than expected in a unit or facility during a given time period or time of year, 
or c) gave no guidance beyond directives to report any "suspected" or "apparent" 
outbreaks or clusters.  
 
Outbreak Resolution 
 At least 14 different criteria for when to conclude an outbreak investigation were 
recommended in 29 (71%) states’ guidelines (see Table 3.3). About one third of the states 
(N = 12, 29%) gave no definition for when to consider an outbreak to be over. Among the 
states that did provide guidance, most (86.2%) gave a specific amount of time to wait 
before declaring an outbreak over, generally ranging from two to seven days. Eleven 
states recommended that the outbreak be considered over after waiting two incubation 
periods, but there was some disagreement on this value as well, with the associated time 
frames for nine states ranging from four to six days, and two states not specifying how 
long two incubation periods should be. However, even when the number of days was the 
same, there was disagreement about when to start counting those days, whether after the 





resolved. Three states recommended waiting to start counting until after the outbreak 
"appears over," and two others only recommended that control measures continue "during 
periods of increased illness" or "until the outbreak has resolved" without specifying how 
to make those determinations.  
 
Mode of Transmission 
 At least six different methods for determining mode of transmission were 
recommended in 15 (37%) states’ guidelines (see Table 3.3). Twenty-six states (63%) 
provided no guidance for identifying the suspected mode of transmission of an outbreak, 
which is a required field for all outbreaks reported to NORS (though it can be entered as 
unknown). Of the states that did provide guidance, recommendations included 
determining whether there was a common source (N = 2, 13%), looking at the shape of 
the epidemic curve (N = 4, 27%), counting the number of incubation periods from the 
initial case to subsequent cases (N = 3, 20%), identifying a rapid increase in cases over a 
short period of time (N = 3, 20%), checking for either a rapid increase in the number of 
cases or a common exposure (N = 1, 7%). Two states (13%) mentioned the mode of 
transmission, but gave no guidance beyond directives to identify it.  
 
Environmental Health Assessments 
 At least six different sets of criteria concerning when to conduct an environmental 
health assessment at a facility experiencing an outbreak were recommended in 13 (32%) 
states’ guidelines (see Table 3.3).Twenty-eight states (68%) provided no guidance on this 





assessment should be conducted if the outbreak appears to be foodborne (N = 1, 8%) or 
caused by a point source (N = 2, 15%), if food handlers become ill (N = 4, 31%), or if 
either the outbreak appears to be foodborne or food handlers become ill (N = 1, 8%). 
Three states (23%) mentioned that an environmental health assessment should be 
conducted, without any guidance on any times when it should not be conducted, and two 
others (15%) indicated that it should only be done if determined to be necessary using 
unspecified criteria.  
 
NORS Analyses 
Several elements identified in the guidelines review were found to have 
implications for outbreak reporting. Variation in guidelines on outbreak detection could 
potentially impact the number of outbreaks reported in a state, while different definitions 
for outbreak resolution could affect the duration of the outbreak and final case counts. 
Lack of guidance on determining the mode of transmission or conducting environmental 
health assessments could result in fewer outbreaks having a mode of transmission 
identified and fewer determined to be foodborne or attributed to other causes. Lower 
recommendations for the number of stool specimens to collect could result in smaller 
proportions of outbreaks having a confirmed etiology. 
A total of 1,253 outbreaks attributed at least in part to laboratory-confirmed or 
suspected norovirus in healthcare settings were reported to NORS in 2015, 1,124 (90%) 
of which occurred in the 41 states with guidelines analyzed in this study. Six states did 
not report any outbreaks that year, and two states reported fewer than five outbreaks, but 





Excluding the two states with fewer than five outbreaks from the analysis resulted in 
qualitatively identical results and similar effect sizes. None of the outbreaks were 
reported to have had exposures in multiple states. 
Outbreak metrics for states with and without recommendations in alignment with 
the HICPAC guidelines are presented in Table 3.4.  States whose recommended ranges 
for specimen collection were consistent with the five specimens recommended by the 
CDC (Figure 3.1) had percentages of norovirus outbreaks with confirmed etiologies 17 
percentage points higher than states with lower ranges (proportion with confirmed 
etiology of 61.8% vs. 45.2%, respectively; p < 0.0001) and 13 percentage points higher 
than states with no guidance (61.8% vs. 48.8%, respectively; p = 0.0056). Meanwhile, 
states with definitions of outbreaks in line with the CDC definition reported 25% fewer 
outbreaks per 100,000 people, on average, than states with less restrictive definitions 
(outbreak rate of 0.37 vs. 0.49 per 100,000 people, respectively; p < 0.0001). States 
recommending at least two days for ill patient isolation had 15% lower average case 
counts than states recommending less than two days (average case count of 30.1 vs. 35.6 
cases, respectively; p = 0.0021) and 29% longer average outbreak duration than states 
with no guidelines on patient isolation (average outbreak duration of 14.0 vs. 10.8 days, 
respectively; p = 0.0082). States recommending at least two days for ill employee 
exclusion had 10% lower average case counts than states recommending less than two 
days for employee exclusion (average case count of 30.5 vs 34.0, respectively; p = 
0.0400). States with recommendations to continue interventions for at least two 
incubation periods after the last case reported 26% shorter outbreak durations than states 
with recommendations to continue interventions for fewer than two incubation periods 
38 
after the last case (average outbreak duration of 11.5 vs. 15.4 days, respectively; p = 
0.0109). There also appeared to be fewer outbreaks categorized as 
"Indeterminate/Other/Unknown" in states providing guidance for identifying an 
outbreak's mode of transmission (1.6% vs. 2.6%, respectively) or when to conduct an 
environmental health assessment (1.6% vs. 2.6%, respectively) compared to states 
providing no guidance, though these proportions were small and the differences were not 
statistically significant. 
Discussion 
This descriptive study is the first to characterize the variability in state-level 
guidelines for AGE outbreak response in healthcare settings. The results provide 
evidence that substantial variation exists in guidelines between states despite the release 
of national guidelines in 2011. The HICPAC guidelines focus on prevention and control 
activities, for which there were higher levels of agreement between states than for other 
outbreak response activities, such as outbreak detection and stool specimen collection, 
which were not directly addressed in the HICPAC guidelines. Outbreak detection, stool 
specimen collection, and other outbreak response activities have been addressed by the 
CDC elsewhere.
56-57
With the exception of patient isolation, this study found more favorable outbreak 
outcomes in states with recommendations in alignment with HICPAC and CDC 
guidelines. These findings support the importance of close adherence to evidence-based 
national guidelines when health departments develop guidelines for their jurisdictions. 
However, there are important limitations of the dataset used, and associations should be 
39 
interpreted with caution. As a passive reporting system, not all states submit outbreak 
data consistently to NORS. Among reported outbreaks, optional variables such as last 
illness date (for determining duration), setting, and etiology may not be consistently 
reported. Investigators of outbreaks reported to NORS may or may not have adhered to 
the state guidelines in the state where they reside. The analysis was strictly observational 
and associations may not be causal, and no multivariate analyses were performed or other 
attempts made to control for potential confounding, which may have significantly 
impacted the observed associations.  
Despite these limitations, the presence of such apparent disparities indicates that 
more can be done to improve the equitability of AGE outbreak response in the U.S. 
Whether conditions favorable to large outbreaks with unconfirmed etiologies result in 
less stringent guidelines or if it is the guidelines themselves not being consistent with 
CDC guidance that causes the less desirable outbreak outcomes is unclear, and there may 
be other factors that explain or contribute to the relationship. For instance, it is possible 
that differential access between states to new diagnostic tests and screening systems for 
norovirus and other AGE pathogens may explain some of the findings. Further research is 
needed to determine whether improvement in state guidelines and access to testing would 
lead to more favorable outcomes. Other factors that were not formally tested included 
whether different guidelines clustered geographically and whether guidelines specific to 
norovirus differed from guidelines meant for AGE outbreaks in general. Neither seems 
likely, as there was no readily apparent clustering among states in the categories analyzed 
in this study, and almost all of the general AGE guidelines still put greater emphasis on 
norovirus than other pathogens. 
40 
Given that 50% of states did not confirm or directly provide any guidelines for 
their states, there is some potential for bias in the results based on nonresponse. Among 
states that responded, 72% had guidelines available online, which is similar to the rate of 
guideline availability (75%) among nonresponding states. However, since additional 
unposted guidelines obtained from responding states increased the percentage with 
guidelines to 84%, it is possible that the five nonresponding states without online 
guidelines, if contacted, could have provided at least one or two more sets of guidelines 
for review, though their inclusion would be unlikely to substantially alter the study 
results. It is also possible that nonresponding states had additional or updated guidelines 
that were different from those available on their websites. However, since the publication 
dates were comparable between responding and nonresponding states and only one 
responding state stated that their online guidelines were out of date, the impact of these 
missing documents is likewise expected to be small. 
AGE outbreak response guidelines are also developed and published at the local 
and territorial levels of public health, but this study is limited to guidelines at the state 
level. The focus on state guidelines restricted the data collection to a manageable scope, 
avoided language barriers (e.g., Puerto Rico has guidelines written in Spanish), and 
reduced variation due to differing government roles, while still covering a diverse range 
of U.S. regions and utilizing the centralized source of guidelines for the majority of 
jurisdictions. Not all states have written guidelines, so the full variability at any given 
time may not be fully captured by document review. Furthermore, several states reported 
that their guidelines were in the process of being updated. Among states with available 
guidelines, element categories were grouped generously, ignoring small deviations in 
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favor of grouping guidelines that were generally similar in nature. Thus, this study 
presents a conservative analysis of the variation in state guidelines at the time the study 
was conducted, and additional variation, though not documented, was certainly present 
and may be expected to change over time. However, there was no apparent convergence 
of the state guidelines over time, and similar patterns of variation were observed 
regardless of the dates indicated in the guidelines. 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
This study has strong implications for public health practice. Despite clear, 
evidence-based national guidance regarding norovirus and related AGE outbreaks in 
healthcare settings, most state health departments have developed their own guidelines 
which often deviate from those issued by HICPAC. Substantial variation also exists in 
other areas that are not directly addressed in the HICPAC guidelines. Variations in state 
guidelines are potentially associated with important outbreak characteristics that may 
influence the size and duration of an outbreak and whether similar outbreaks can be 
prevented in the future. The causes of the observed variation are unknown, but all states 
would likely benefit from reviewing their guidelines and addressing deviations from 
national recommendations. It is important for the public health community to have a 
broader conversation about how local guidelines are developed and the importance of 
adhering to national guidelines, or updating national guidelines if local practices are 
shown to be superior. Other potential next steps may include further investigation into 
topics with especially wide variation (such as stool specimen collection) and efforts to 
bridge gaps in the current national guidelines. 
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Conclusion 
This study identified substantial variation in state healthcare-associated AGE 
outbreak response guidelines beyond that which would reasonably be expected based on 
national guidelines and the scientific evidence. Such variation must be considered when 
planning national CDS systems for outbreak response and other public health use cases. 
This variation appeared to be associated with differences in outbreak characteristics 
reported to NORS, including number of outbreaks, outbreak duration, case counts, modes 
of transmission, and etiology confirmation. These findings may be used to encourage 
public health officials to carefully consider any divergence from national guidelines as 
they develop and revise jurisdictional guidelines. More research is needed to understand 
why this variation exists, how it impacts outbreak outcomes, and where improvements in 
evidence-based recommendations and communication of national guidance are needed. 
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Table 3.1. Numbers of states with public health recommendations aligned with 
CDC categories for prevention and control during acute gastroenteritis outbreaks 
in healthcare settings (N = 41 states with available guidelines). 
Recommendations for prevention and control Count (%) 
(1) Patient cohorting & isolation 40 (98) 
(2) Hand hygiene 41 (100) 
(3) Patient transfers & ward closure 29 (71) 
(4) Food handlers 37 (90) 
(5) Diagnostics 38 (93) 
(6) Personal protective equipment 37 (90) 
(7) Environmental cleaning 39 (95) 
(8) Staff leave & policy 41 (100) 
(9) Visitors 34 (83) 
(10) Education 35 (85) 
(11) Active case-finding 32 (78) 










Table 3.2. Numbers of states with recommendations for duration of patient isolation 
and staff exclusion (N = 41 states with available guidelines). 
 
Recommendation for duration of ill patient isolation and 
ill staff exclusion 
Patients Staff 
Count (%) Count (%) 
Recommendation provided 27 (66) 40 (98) 
Until symptoms resolve 0 (0) 4 (10) 
1 day after resolution of symptoms 2 (7) 4 (10) 
1-3 days after resolution of symptoms 3 (11) 1 (3) 
2 days after resolution of symptoms 13 (48) 17 (43) 
2-3 days after resolution of symptoms 1 (4) 6 (15) 
3 days after resolution of symptoms 8 (30) 8 (20) 













Table 3.3. Recommendation categories found in at least 10 states’ guidelines for 




Number of states with 
recommendations (%) 
Total number of 
distinct 
recommendations 
Ill patient isolation duration 27 (66) 5 
Ill employee exclusion duration 40 (98) 6 
Stool specimen collection ranges 36 (88) 21 
Outbreak detection definition 40 (98) 14 
Outbreak resolution definition 29 (71) 11 
Mode of transmission determination 15 (37) 6 












Table 3.4. Description of norovirus outbreaks in healthcare settings reported to the 
National Outbreak Reporting System (NORS) in 2015, stratified by features of 
norovirus outbreak response guidance collected from state health departments in 
2016. 
 




Value (%, rate, 
or mean) 
Percentage with confirmed etiology (N = 35) 1,124 51.2% 
No. of stool specimens to be collected: 




No. of stool specimens to be collected: 
median of range less than 5 (N = 13) 
595 45.2%** 
No guidance or unspecified number of 
specimens (N = 9) 
160 48.8%* 
Number of outbreaks per 100,000 pop. (N = 35) 1,124 0.43 
Outbreak defined as 2+ epidemiologically-




Outbreak defined as 3+ epidemiologically-
linked cases, "more than expected", or 
suspicion (N = 21) 
622 0.49** 
Average number of cases per outbreak (N = 35) 1,124 31.8 














Table 3.4 continued. 




Value (%, rate, 
or mean) 
Patient isolation for < 2 days after resolution 
(N = 5) 
191 31.6 
No guidance on patient isolation (N = 11) 302 35.6* 
Employee exclusion for 2+ days after 




Employee exclusion for < 2 days after 
resolution (N = 7) 
271 34.0* 
No guidance on employee exclusion (N = 2) — — 





3+, variable, or unspecified definitions (N = 
21) 
622 32.0 
Wait ≥ 2 incubation periods to declare an 




Wait < 2 incubation periods to declare an 
outbreak is resolved (N = 12) 
445 32.5 








Table 3.4 continued. 




Value (%, rate, 
or mean) 
Average outbreak duration in days (N = 35) 1,124 13.2 





Patient isolation for < 2 days after resolution 
(N = 5) 
191 10.8* 
No guidance on patient isolation (N = 11) 302 13.4 
Employee exclusion for 2+ days after 




Employee exclusion for < 2 days after 
resolution (N = 7) 
271 11.9 
No guidance on employee exclusion (N = 2) — — 
Wait ≥ 2 incubation periods to declare an 




Wait < 2 incubation periods to declare an 
outbreak is resolved (N = 12) 
445 15.4* 
No guidance on outbreak resolution (N = 9) 124 12.6 
§
Reference recommendation – consistent with HICPAC and/or CDC guidance 
*p-value < 0.05 when compared to reference recommendation 
**p-value < 0.005 when compared to reference recommendation 









Figure 3.1. Percent of outbreaks with confirmed etiology reported to the National 
Outbreak Reporting System in 2015 by recommended ranges for stool specimen 
collection obtained from state health departments in 2016 (diamonds indicate range 
medians; arrows indicate ranges with no upper bounds) (N = 16 states with 
available outbreak data). Correlation coefficient = 0.71 (p = 0.004) for stool 
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MATHEMATICAL MODELING TO SUPPORT TRANSMISSION MODE 
CLASSIFICATION FOR ACUTE GASTROENTERITIS OUTBREAK 
RESPONSE AND REPORTING 
 
Introduction 
Acute gastroenteritis (AGE) outbreaks are a major cause of illness in the U.S., and 
most outbreaks are caused by person-to-person transmission of norovirus.
1
 
Recommended interventions to control AGEs vary based on the pathogen and mode of 
transmission,
2,3
 but many outbreaks reported to the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC) are never confirmed to have been caused by a specific agent or mode 
of transmission.
1
 This lack of information is challenging for public health officials 
making decisions about how to respond to outbreaks, especially early in outbreaks when 
only limited information may be available. Early identification of point source 
transmission events, such as a contaminated food, fomite, or highly infectious individual, 
allows an outbreak to be flagged for a more targeted public health response than would 
occur for outbreaks that are assumed to be transmitted person-to-person.
2
 
The National Outbreak Reporting System (NORS) was launched in February 





acute gastroenteritis outbreaks through an online portal.
1
 AGE outbreaks are defined by 
NORS as 2 or more cases of similar illness epidemiologically linked to a common 
exposure. The four required fields for reporting an outbreak to NORS are the primary 
mode of transmission, date the first case became ill, reporting state, and the estimated 
total number of primary cases.
4
 The infection attack rate (number infected/number 
exposed) is an important statistic used to characterize an outbreak,
4
 and thus the number 
exposed, or size of the population affected by an outbreak, is often also reported or at 
least estimated. Due to their importance in outbreak characterization and outbreak 
reporting, these data fields may often be collected at the initial report of the outbreak to 
public health. The inclusion of additional detailed information on the setting, contributing 
factors, implicated food vehicles, etc., is also strongly encouraged.
4
 
The mode of transmission selected by an investigator completing the NORS web-
based reporting forms determines which additional data elements are presented to the 
user of the input screen. The mode of transmission may be identified as "foodborne," 
"waterborne," "animal contact," "person-to-person," "environmental contamination," or 
"indeterminate/unknown." More generally, the mode of transmission may be classified as 
either person-to-person, point source (including, animal contact, environmental 
contamination, foodborne, and waterborne), or unknown. Though it is a required field in 
NORS, the selection of the mode of transmission is largely based on the findings of the 
investigation and may be subject to error. For example, the NORS guidelines specify that 
transmission should be considered person-to-person "if most of the patients had known 
direct contact or likely had the opportunity for direct contact with one another" or where 







definition allows room for interpretation, and if a common food or environmental source 
is not readily identified, it could result in point source outbreaks being misclassified as 
person-to-person. There is some historical evidence of misclassification, as the CDC 
found a decline in foodborne outbreaks after 2009, when the option for modes of 
transmission other than foodborne was first introduced in the NORS reporting system.
5
 
This decline suggests that some outbreaks that would currently be classified as person-to-
person in NORS were previously being classified as foodborne. It is possible that the 
inclusion of additional modes of transmission has improved the accuracy of transmission 
mode classification over time, but the potential for misclassification remains high, 
especially in settings such as long-term care facilities where point source transmission 
may not be easily recognized and modes of transmission other than person-to-person 
transmission may be plausible. 
Mathematical models have been widely used for determining optimal control 
measures during outbreaks.
6
 However, these models appear to have primarily addressed 
control measures that are to be implemented for known infectious agents during large-
scale pandemics. Modeling for smaller, local outbreaks, which health departments are 
likely to face more frequently than pandemics and where the infectious agent and mode 
of transmission may not be known, are not well represented in the literature. However, 
the information that is expected to be known early in outbreaks (such as case count, 
affected population size, and number of days since the first onset of illness) is sufficient 
for the development of simple mathematical models for transmission. The results of such 
models can then be used to predict whether the observed outbreak data are consistent 





investigators with identifying point source transmission is useful for guiding initial 
outbreak response, collection of needed data, and reporting of outbreaks to NORS. Thus, 
such models could provide important clinical decision support (CDS) for outbreak 
investigators. 
This study sought to a) validate the ability of a mathematical model to detect point 
source transmission using outbreak data from NORS and b) estimate the number of 
norovirus outbreaks classified as person-to-person in NORS that have some evidence of 
point source transmission according to the model. 
 
Methods 
Outbreaks reported to NORS during 2009-2014 were obtained for analysis, 
including outbreaks due to animal contact, environmental contamination, foodborne 
transmission, person-to-person transmission, and indeterminate/other/unknown sources 
(Figure 4.1). This set of outbreaks does not include waterborne outbreaks because they 
are reported to a separate reporting system. Outbreaks due to foodborne sources and 
animal contact were excluded because detailed information required to develop the 
model, such as the total number at risk of exposure, was not systematically collected in 
NORS during the study period. In addition, outbreaks with affected population sizes 
larger than 5,000 persons were excluded due to concerns regarding reporting accuracy 
and a focus on more typical, smaller scale outbreaks. The resulting subset of NORS 
outbreaks with sufficient data for modeling is hereinafter referred to as "the NORS 
dataset." 





transmission, incubation period, duration of symptoms, and size of the affected 
population) were analyzed for missing information, and the percentage of outbreaks with 
complete information was reported. The model was then developed and validated. 
Outbreaks were categorized by the primary mode of transmission reported to NORS, and 
a subset were reclassified for a subanalysis as described below. Confirmed and suspect 
etiologies were included in subanalyses, and outbreaks with multiple etiologies were 
attributed to norovirus if norovirus was included among the identified etiologies.  
 
Mathematical Model Development 
Basic reproduction number 
The basic reproduction number (R0) is an important measure of how easily a 
pathogen is transmitted person-to-person. Becker's method
7
 estimates the basic 
reproduction number R0 using only three statistics from an outbreak: the final number of 
cases (C), the number susceptible before the outbreak (S), and the total population size 
(N). The estimate, as simplified by Mossong and Muller,
8































These formulae were used to estimate the basic reproduction number for each 





100% susceptibility and a single initial case. To simulate individual-level heterogeneity 
in transmissibility, each susceptible individual in each outbreak was assigned a unique 
basic reproduction number sampled from a gamma distribution with mean and standard 
deviation set to the population-wide value estimated for the outbreak using equations 1 
and 2. This formulation prevented most individuals (99%) from having basic 
reproduction numbers more than double a typical basic reproduction number for 
norovirus,
9




Model parameters and structure 
Given the limited nature of the available data during AGE outbreaks, simplifying 
assumptions were necessary in the development of the mathematical model. A 
susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered (SEIR) model structure was selected due to the 
clinical course followed by AGE infections, with transitions occurring daily for 
simplicity. Parameters for the incubation period (1/σ, where σ is the daily transition 
probability between exposed and infectious) and duration of symptoms (1/γ, where γ is 
the daily transition probability between infectious and recovered) were approximated 
based on estimates from the CDC for norovirus.
3
 These parameters were rounded to the 
nearest full day for simplicity and consistency with NORS units for outbreak duration. 
The incubation period was allowed to vary uniformly between 1 and 2 days, and the 
duration of symptoms was allowed to vary uniformly between 1 and 3 days (Table 4.1) 
for each infected individual. The daily transition probabilities between disease states for 
these individuals were then derived by taking the inverse of the selected values for 





between individuals (γR0, the daily transition probability between susceptible and 
exposed) was determined by multiplying the inverse of the duration of symptoms by an 
estimate of the basic reproduction number.
11
 For each day of an outbreak, each individual 
in the affected population was assessed to determine, based on their current status (S, E, 
I, or R), their individual basic reproduction number, and the randomly selected incubation 
period and duration of symptoms, whether they would progress to the next disease state 
according to the transition probabilities described above. 
Parameters for diseases other than norovirus were not included due to the relative 
abundance of norovirus outbreaks in NORS and the distinct clinical profile of norovirus 
that make it more easily distinguishable from other gastrointestinal pathogens in the 
absence of stool testing results.
12
 The proportion of the population susceptible to 
infection (S) was assumed to be 100% due to findings that infection rates for norovirus 
approach 100% among older adults
13
 and the frequency of reported outbreaks in the 
NORS dataset where all at-risk subjects were reported to have become ill. For simplicity, 
a single initial case, absence of asymptomatic shedding, and closed populations were all 




Monte Carlo simulations, with values sampled from probability distributions 
instead of relying on fixed parameter estimates, were used to better capture the random 
variation expected in small populations.
14
 The model was run 1,000 times for each 





final case count expected for the outbreak under the model assumptions. An interval 





 quantiles as the lower and upper limits, respectively. If the actual final 
case count (C) fell within this interval, an outbreak was considered to be consistent with 
person-to-person transmission of norovirus. If the actual final case count fell outside the 
interval limits, the outbreak was considered to be inconsistent with person-to-person 
transmission of norovirus due to point source transmission by contaminated food, fomite, 
highly infectious individual, or other means, or to a pathogen with a clinical profile 
significantly different from norovirus. 
Trace plots, mean plots, and autocorrelation plots for the estimated final case 
counts were visually inspected for a subset of outbreaks to ensure that each final case 




Model Validation Using Simulated Outbreaks 
The internal validity of the modeling approach was evaluated by running 
additional simulated outbreaks with and without artificially-introduced point source 
transmission and then evaluating the performance of the model on those outbreaks. 
Artificial case counts were estimated using the affected population size and duration of 
each outbreak in the NORS dataset, the assumed incubation period and duration of 
symptoms for norovirus, and an assumed basic reproduction number of 1.64
9-10,16-17
 for 
each case except the initial case. This value was considered typical of person-to-person 
transmission of norovirus in low-transmission settings.
9
 The initial case acted as a "super-





transmission), two times, four times, or six times the basic reproduction number of the 
other individuals in the models. Such "super-spreader" events would be expected to 
behave similarly to point source events with other causes, such as a vomiting incident in a 
common area or a contaminated food item. The resulting artificial case counts were then 
used to run simulations using the Becker method as described above to estimate the basic 
reproduction numbers, and the expected case count intervals for these simulations were 
compared to the artificial case counts. The specificity (for the typical person-to-person 
R0) and sensitivity (for two, four, or six multiples of the typical R0) of the model 
predictions were calculated, and the Wilson score method was used to estimate 95% 
confidence intervals for sensitivity estimates. 
 
Model Validation Comparing Likely Point Source vs.  
Person-to-Person Outbreaks 
External validity was evaluated by comparing outbreaks with some reported 
evidence of point-source transmission to outbreaks with no such documentation. Though 
the majority of outbreaks in the NORS dataset were categorized as person-to-person, 
outbreaks were considered to be indicative of point-source transmission for this analysis 
if they had "Environmental contamination other than food/water" as a primary 
transmission mode, if they included "Food" or "Environmental contamination other than 
food/water" as secondary transmission modes, or if "Restaurant" was a primary or 
secondary setting. Other outbreaks from the NORS dataset that did not meet these criteria 
were considered to be eligible controls, and five control outbreaks were randomly 





outbreak case. Sensitivity was calculated for the model outcomes as a measure of the 
model's ability to reliably categorize point-source outbreaks. 
The control outbreaks were selected based on matching characteristics with the 
"likely" point source outbreaks and are not expected to be representative of the broader 
collection of outbreaks without documented evidence of point source transmission. 
Furthermore, it is impossible to know how representative these outbreaks are of non-
point source outbreaks in general, since there is currently no definitive way to verify the 
modes of transmission in outbreaks reported to NORS. However, these outbreaks are still 
useful for comparison since they would be expected to be true person-to-person outbreaks 
more often than the outbreaks identified as likely point source.  
Logistic regression was used to calculate odds ratios comparing the mathematical 
model predictions for the likely point-source outbreaks to those for the control outbreaks, 
with and without random effects included to account for within-subjects variation based 
on the outbreak matching by month and year. The ability to include random effects in the 
model made it possible to detect any temporal trends that might have differentially 
influenced the prevalence of outcomes in the control outbreaks. Model fit was assessed 
using the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
 
Assessment of Classification Among Reported Outbreaks 
The model was used to classify all outbreaks with sufficient data in the NORS 
dataset, regardless of etiology. Though the model assumes the pathogen is norovirus, 
outbreak investigators may not know the specific pathogen at the onset of an outbreak, 





of outbreaks attributable to norovirus and the subset of outbreaks attributable to other 
pathogens were also analyzed, though the model would not be expected to reliably detect 
point source transmission among outbreaks that are not attributable to norovirus. Among 
the overall dataset and the etiology subsets, the proportions of outbreaks determined to be 
inconsistent with person-to-person norovirus were based on the simple ratios of outbreaks 
with likely point source transmission indicated by the model to the total number of 
outbreaks available for modeling. 
 
Results 
Sample of Outbreaks Used in Analyses 
Overall, 6,341 (47%) outbreaks had sufficient data for modeling (final case count, 
size of the affected population, and outbreak duration – Table 4.2). Eleven outbreaks had 
affected population sizes larger than 5,000 and were excluded, leaving 6,330 outbreaks 
available for modeling. Of these outbreaks, 5,955 (94%) had a primary mode of 
transmission reported as person-to-person, 8 (0%) were attributed to environmental 
contamination, and 367 (6%) were indeterminate (see Figure 4.1). Altogether, 4,163 
(66%) had an assigned etiology, including 3,724 (89%) attributed to norovirus, and 3,552 
(85%) attributed to person-to-person transmission of norovirus. 
Of the 6,330 outbreaks with sufficient data, there were 146 outbreaks with 
documented evidence indicative of likely point source transmission (based on primary or 
secondary modes of transmission or a restaurant setting). These 146 outbreaks were 
reported in NORS with primary modes of transmission of person-to-person (N = 98), 





were 730 matched outbreaks without reported evidence of point source transmission 
randomly selected as controls, including outbreaks reported in NORS due to person-to-
person (N = 679) and indeterminate/other/unknown (N = 51) transmission .  
 
Model Validation and Assessment of Classification Among  
Reported Outbreaks 
When point source events were introduced artificially, the accuracy of the 
mathematical model predictions increased with the artificial event size, with 7% 
sensitivity for outbreaks with simulated transmission events twice as large as would be 
expected for strictly person-to-person transmission, 64% for four times as large, and 78% 
for six times as large (see Figure 4.2). The specificity of the model was 99.99% for 
simulated outbreaks without the artificial introduction of a point source event (typical 
person-to-person R0). 
When applying the model to likely point source outbreaks, the odds of the model 
indicating some evidence of point source transmission were 3.2 (1.9-5.3) times higher for 
outbreaks with documented likely point source transmission reported in NORS than for 
outbreaks without such findings. The sensitivity of the model for detecting these likely 
point source outbreaks was 87% (Table 4.3). The logistic regression did not perform 
better with random effects based on outbreak matching included, indicating no temporal 
trends that needed to be accounted for, so random effects were removed from the final 
model. 
When applied to the full dataset of outbreaks with data sufficient for modeling, 





and indeterminate/other/unknown outbreaks were inconsistent with person-to-person 
transmission of norovirus. When applied to the subset of 3,552 norovirus outbreaks 
attributed to person-to-person transmission, the model indicated that 73% of these 
outbreaks were inconsistent with person-to-person transmission of norovirus, and thus 
likely had point source transmission occur at some point during the outbreaks. When 
applied to the 611 outbreaks with confirmed or suspect pathogens other than norovirus or 
environmental contamination or unknown/indeterminate modes of transmission, only 




The mathematical model developed for this research performed adequately on 
measures of internal and external validity and indicated that nearly three-fourths of 
outbreaks reported as person-to-person exhibited some evidence of point source 
transmission. This large number of outbreaks with potential point source transmission 
identified among AGE outbreaks suggests a need for more reliable methods of 
transmission mode classification. While little was found in the literature to address this 
problem, the simple mathematical modeling approach in this paper appears to be 
adequate for use in public health decision support. The model detected simulated point 
source events with basic reproduction numbers below four times higher than expected. In 
contrast, the model sensitivity for the subset of outbreaks with documented likely point 
source transmission in NORS suggests that outbreak investigators detect point source 





model was 78% for detecting simulated outbreaks with initial transmission event six 
times larger than expected versus 87% for detecting outbreaks with evidence of likely 
point source transmission documented by investigators in NORS. This improvement in 
detection would increase the number of likely point source outbreaks from 2.3% for the 
146 likely point source outbreaks documented by investigators in NORS to 70% total 
indicated by the model. Such a large increase would be potentially burdensome for 
responding officials, but the almost one-third of outbreaks that were still identified as 
consistent with person-to-person transmission of norovirus indicates that the model 
would still be useful for triage. 
There are several limitations associated with the modeling approach used in this 
study. The Becker method was selected due to practical concerns, but it is unlikely to be 
the most accurate estimate for the basic reproduction number. Methods that use more 
information should be more accurate and are advisable when detailed individual-level 
data are available. Homogeneous mixing is unlikely to accurately represent the true 
patterns of infectious contact in a population, and efforts to better characterize these 
patterns, such as distinguishing between residents and staff in settings like nursing 
homes, may be essential to acceptable model performance in such settings. Similarly, 
more precise values for the incubation period and duration of symptoms would likely 
result in more precise model results where such data are available. 
Other factors not included in the model, such as new admissions and transfers in 
healthcare settings and asymptomatic shedding can also have important impacts on 
outbreak persistence. However, most of the settings covered in this study stop new 





that would limit the impact of symptomatic and asymptomatic shedding.
3
 Likewise, the 
individual basic reproduction numbers in the model varied according to the standard 
deviation of the population standard deviation estimates, which underestimates the 
variance that would be expected to actually occur among individuals. This assumption 
made the simulated outbreaks more consistent with "low-level" transmission of norovirus 
and thus more sensitive to events at the super-spreader level selected for the study. 
However, though this underestimation made the simulations more useful in practice, it 
also made them somewhat less reflective of reality. Despite these limitations, the model 
was designed with parsimony in mind, and we felt the disadvantages were outweighed by 
its portability and simplified communicability and implementation. 
There were also limitations in the study designs used for validation. These 
limitations were mostly driven by the unavailability of data sufficient to readily answer 
the questions of interest. However, despite data not being systematically collected for 
animal contact and foodborne outbreaks and the absence of definitive means for 
identifying an absence of point source transmission, we were able to make assessments of 
validity by using simulations and secondary investigator findings documented in NORS. 
However, there were significant limitations to this approach. Simulations of point source 
transmission due to "super-spreaders" with variable basic reproduction numbers were 
used, but this is only one type of point source transmission. Structuring the simulations 
differently to imitate other means of point source transmission may lead to different 
results. Also, the sensitivity and specificity of the model simulations may have overstated 
the model performance due to the low variability in the estimates of the intentionally 





with and without likely point source transmission was likely conservative due to the high 
potential for undetected point source events in the control outbreaks. Also, the model did 
not detect as many aberrations when applied to outbreaks caused by other pathogens or 
modes of transmission, likely due to the model assumption that the outbreak was caused 
by person-to-person transmission of norovirus. This discrepancy is likely due to 
differences in the prevalence of point source transmission among non-norovirus 
outbreaks reported to be person-to-person rather than to a failure of the model, which is 
not designed to discriminate between different types of person-to-person outbreaks. The 
inclusion of other pathogens in the model validation is another reason to conclude that the 
validation findings are likely conservative. More research needs to be done on how to 
improve the model to address this subset of outbreaks or to identify other means of 
distinguishing between potential pathogens when only limited information is available. 
There are significant limitations in the interpretability of the model results. 
Strictly speaking, the model may only indicate whether or not an outbreak is inconsistent 
with person-to-person transmission of norovirus. An outbreak with a higher case count 
than that predicted by the model may be interpreted as having evidence of likely point 
source transmission, but this finding may also have other explanations. There may have 
been multiple initial infected individuals instead of one (e.g., if individuals were 
transferred from one facility to another at the same time), or the date of first onset used 
for the model may be later than the actual first onset date, which may not be known. If 
the actual case count falls below the lower limit for the model estimate, the outbreak may 
be caused by a pathogen other than norovirus or may be consistent with a continuing 
common source transmission type.
2





is unknown how often such missing data may occur or how much impact it would have 
on the model results. It is generally impossible to distinguish outbreaks with complete 
case counts from those missing affected individuals. The possibility that an outbreak 
indicated as consistent with person-to-person norovirus may still be caused by other 
pathogens/modes of transmission is another important limitation that must be factored 
into any outbreak response decisions informed by the model results. The model is 
intended to support decision-making, but caution would be required when using any 
model findings. 
The variables necessary for estimating the basic reproduction number were 
collected in nearly half of outbreaks where it was possible for the data to be entered into 
NORS, suggesting that there are no substantial barriers preventing the use of the model 
for decision support in many investigating jurisdictions. Yet there are important 
considerations concerning the use of the model in public health practice. Becker’s 
method was developed based on the final case count, but there may be little if any need 
for decision support after an outbreak has concluded. This approach was followed in this 
paper due to the nature of the NORS data used for validation, but it would have little 
utility in actual outbreak response. However, Becker suggested a solution to a similar 
problem regarding when the number susceptible diminishes to zero despite there still 
being infected individuals in the population. This occurrence would result in a cumulative 
amount of "wasted infectious period," which Becker recommended could be accounted 
for by subtracting the number of individuals in the last generation from the final case 
count in the formulae.
7
 An adjustment similar to Becker’s recommendation can be 





currently symptomatic is known and adequately approximates the last generation of 
cases. Information on the number currently ill is not required when reporting to NORS, 
but such monitoring is encouraged in outbreak investigation guidelines.
3
 
This adjustment would allow the model to be run at any point during an outbreak 
investigation, making it useful for decision support as early as the first report if the 
necessary information for running the model is collected. However, there is a tradeoff, as 
the smaller sample sizes would impact the reliability of the estimates, especially early in 
an outbreak. As jurisdictions gain experience using the model in their individual practice 
settings, thresholds can be developed for outbreak response triage that maximize the 
effectiveness of the model in those settings. Investigators can use wider percentile limits 
or cut-points in empirical p-values to limit the response or rank outbreaks according to 
agency capacity or preference. 
 
Conclusion 
This study demonstrates the potential utility of mathematical modeling for 
decision support in routine AGE outbreak response and reporting. A mathematical model 
developed to distinguish outbreaks caused by person-to-person transmission of norovirus 
from outbreaks with potential point source transmission performed well on measures of 
internal and external validity. The large number of outbreaks with previously unidentified 
potential point source transmission events identified by the model suggests a large 





The outbreak data used to build and validate the models in this study were 








Table 4.1. List of mathematical model parameter values. 
Parameter Description Value Ref. 
Δt Time step 1 day — 
C Final case count From NORS NORS team, 2017 
N Affected population size From NORS NORS team, 2017 
S Susceptible population size N – 1 — 
t0 Date of first onset From NORS NORS team, 2017 
tN Date of last onset From NORS NORS team, 2017 
tN – t0 Duration of outbreak tN – t0 — 
Ȓ0 






Empirical basic reproduction 
number 
1.64 Simmons et al., 2013 
1/σ Incubation period 1-2 days Hall et al., 2011 
1/γ Duration of symptoms 1-3 days Hall et al., 2011 
Β 








Table 4.2. Availability of data by mode of transmission for acute gastroenteritis 
outbreaks reported to the National Outbreak Reporting System, 2009-2014. 










Total outbreaks 11,447 (100) 55 (100) 1,961 (100) 
Final case count 11,447 (100) 55 (100) 1,961 (100) 
Date of first onset 11,447 (100) 55 (100) 1,961 (100) 
Date of last onset 8,558 (75) 51 (93) 1,819 (93) 
Confirmed or suspect pathogen 8,042 (70) 50 (91) 1,146 (58) 
Number of exposed guests/staff 6,026 (53) 10 (18) 382 (19) 
Adequate data for modeling 5,955 (52) 8 (15) 367 (19) 








Table 4.3. Mathematical model performance for person-to-person, environmental 
contamination, and indeterminate transmission mode outbreaks with and without 
documented evidence of likely point source transmission reported to the National 
Outbreak Reporting System during 2009-2014. 
 
Model prediction 
Likely point source 
outbreaks* Control outbreaks OR (95% CI) 








19 236 1.0 (—) 
Total 146 730 
 
Sensitivity 87% — 
*Defined as outbreaks with environmental contamination as the primary mode of 
transmission and person-to-person or indeterminate transmission outbreaks with 
foodborne or environmental contamination as a secondary transmission mode or 
restaurant as a primary or secondary setting. 
  
78 
Figure 4.1. Description of nonwaterborne outbreaks from the National Outbreak 










Figure 4.2. Sensitivity of a mathematical model for detecting artificially introduced 
super-spreader transmission events that were 2, 4, and 6 times the basic 
reproduction number of 1.64 associated with person-to-person transmission of 
norovirus for 6,330 acute gastroenteritis outbreaks reported to the National 
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IMPACT OF DATA AVAILABILITY ON PUBLIC HEALTH DECISION-MAKING 
DURING ACUTE GASTROENTERITIS OUTBREAKS: IMPLICATIONS FOR 
DECISION SUPPORT 
Introduction 
When facing an outbreak of infectious disease, there are several activities 
routinely pursued in the outbreak response, such as establishing the existence of the 
outbreak, verifying diagnoses, and developing and testing hypotheses to guide control 
measures.
1 
The availability of information is vital to the completion of each of these
steps. Unfortunately, the necessary information to respond appropriately is often 
unavailable to investigating officials. 
Acute gastroenteritis (AGE) outbreaks are a major cause of illness in the U.S., 
commonly seen and investigated by public health departments.
2
 Recommended control
measures vary based on the pathogen and mode of transmission.
2,3
 For example,
environmental health assessments (EHA), or onsite visits to affected facilities by 
environmental health staff, are commonly utilized during point source outbreaks,  where 
a single source, such as a food vehicle, fomite, or highly infectious individual is the cause 





confirmed to have been caused by specific agents,
4
 and the reported mode of transmission 
is often unconfirmed.
5
 Of AGE outbreaks with laboratory-confirmed pathogens, most are 
caused by person-to-person transmission of norovirus, a highly infectious gastrointestinal 
pathogen.
2
 Current guidelines recommend using Kaplan’s Criteria for outbreaks in which 
such information remains unknown to determine whether the causal pathogen may be 
norovirus,
6
 but the information necessary to apply Kaplan's Criteria has been found to be 
available in only 37% of outbreaks of unknown etiology.
7
 
Several studies have shown that norovirus can be distinguished from other enteric 
pathogens by clinical attributes such as the incubation period and duration of illness.
7-10
 
Using Kaplan’s Criteria6 has been found to be relatively sensitive (68%) with very high 
specificity (99%).
7
 Other techniques have also performed well, with successful attribution 







though no record of these techniques being used in applied practice was readily found in 
the literature. Furthermore, each of these methods was applied to subsets of data 
containing information that a health department may not often have readily available at 
any point during an outbreak (such as Kaplan’s Criteria7). 
Mathematical modeling is an analytical process whereby "population parameters 
are described by symbols and linked by algebraic formulae" to "provide a realistic 
representation of the real world."
11
 These models have been widely used in the study of 
human infectious diseases.
11
 Mathematical models have also been widely used for 
identifying the best control measures to use during outbreaks.
12
 The success of techniques 
that use clinical profiles for norovirus attribution suggests that the parameters for a 





period and duration of illness) can be expected to be relatively consistent between 
populations. This finding allows the potential for these parameters to be assumed where 
they cannot be collected as part of an investigation. Such assumptions enable a model to 
be run using only basic preliminary information such as the current number of cases, size 
of the at-risk population, and the number of days since the first onset of illness – which 
may be among the first items of information obtained during an outbreak investigation. 
Such a mathematical model would be able to predict with reasonable confidence whether 
the number of outbreak cases over time is consistent with person-to-person transmission 
of norovirus. The sensitivity and specificity of the model would be expected to approach 
that of clinical profile-based approaches, but while only requiring data that are available 
most or all of the time. However, even with high measures of validity, the willingness of 
public health practitioners to utilize such a tool for decision support is unknown. A 
clinical decision support system (CDS) with an acceptable user interface and adequate 
measures of usability would be necessary for mathematical modeling of person-to-person 
transmission of norovirus to be an effective public health resource in practice. 
This study sought to investigate a) how outbreak investigators make decisions in 
the absence of detailed information, such as epidemic curves and the data required to 
apply Kaplan's Criteria; b) how the accuracy of those decisions changes when detailed 
information is available; and c) how decisions based on results from a CDS would 






A convenience sample of participants was selected from two small rural local 
health departments (LHDs) (population < 100 000, population density < 1 000 per square 
mile), one medium-sized urban LHD (population = 100 000 to 500 000), one large urban 
LHD (population > 500 000), and a state department of health. The distribution of 
participants was intended to approximately reflect the numerical and geographical 
distribution of public health staff responsible for AGE outbreak response statewide. The 
study was also designed to support the generalizability of findings to health departments 
of different sizes and populations (Table 5.1). Participation requests with study 
information and participant consent forms were sent to supervisory-level staff at each site 
via email. Two additional AGE epidemiologists were invited to participate, but declined. 
Interviews 
All interviews were performed onsite at the respective health departments by CG. 
Only one participant was interviewed at a time, with only the interviewer and the 
individual being interviewed present.  
Interviews were semistructured and consisted of two phases: an initial open-
ended phase about general AGE outbreak response in participants' jurisdictions, and a 
second phase of hypothetical outbreak scenarios based on the literature and participants' 
immediate conclusions and response decisions in different scenario conditions. Different 
levels of information were presented for each scenario. Minimal summary data, as might 





determine the likely mode of transmission for norovirus outbreaks, and detailed summary 
data including an epidemic curve and data required to apply Kaplan's Criteria
6
 were 
presented. Follow-up and clarifying questions were asked throughout both phases as 
needed. Detailed instructions were given before each phase, and all notes were recorded 
in a paper notebook by the interviewer. 
 
Open-ended questions 
For the open-ended phase, the participant was asked to consider a generic AGE 
outbreak report in their jurisdiction and then to answer four standard questions related to 
typical actions taken, decision-making, and data availability (Figure 5.1). These questions 
were designed to provide context for interpreting participant answers during the outbreak 
scenarios. Participant responses relevant to the study objectives were summarized. 
 
Outbreak scenarios 
The 10 outbreak scenarios were carefully selected from the literature,
13-22
 with the 
distribution of settings intended to approximately represent that seen in practice
1
 (Table 
5.2). Outbreaks in restaurants were excluded, since such outbreaks are usually readily 
attributable to foodborne transmission
3
 with little need for decision support. Other 
outbreak settings, such as petting zoos and water parks, were similarly excluded. 
Outbreaks were considered for inclusion if they were attributed at least in part to 
norovirus (the focus of the CDS) and if the daily case count (clearly identifiable in a table 
or epidemic curve in the outbreak report), number of individuals in the affected 





were not given any information indicating the pathogen beyond the summary data 
contained in the scenarios. Data were summarized at the midpoint of the outbreaks to 
simulate the timing of outbreak reporting in practice. 
Participants were instructed that each simulated outbreak report was for 
symptoms consistent with AGE. The data availability levels presented for each scenario 
included: 
 Minimal summary data. A paragraph of text describing the setting, current 
case count (with separate numbers for residents/patients and staff where 
appropriate), size of the affected population, attack rate (case count/size of the 
affected population), number of days since first onset, and number currently 
ill. (All scenarios at this level also included the statement, "No food handlers 
are known to have been ill, and there are no other known common 
exposures"); 
 CDS results. A chart of predicted cumulative case counts (Figure 5.2), 
including the upper, median, and lower bounds for each simulated day of the 
outbreak under the assumption of person-to-person transmission of norovirus; 
a block of text listing the 95% confidence interval for the current day of the 
outbreak; the actual case count reported on that day; and a statement of "No 
evidence of point source transmission" or "Some evidence of point source 
transmission" depending on whether the actual case count fell within the 95% 
confidence interval for the predicted case count; 
 Detailed summary data. A table including Kaplan's Criteria for determining 
if an outbreak is likely caused by norovirus
6





each criterion and a chart depicting the epidemic curve for the outbreak up to 
the current date (with separate numbers for residents/patients and staff where 
appropriate). 
The minimal summary data were intended to represent the information that might be 
provided during an initial report of an outbreak from the public.
23-24
 The statement about 
the absence of known food handlers or other common exposures was not taken from the 
outbreak reports in the literature, but was intended to represent the common situation 
faced by outbreak investigators where such information is unknown. 
The order in which the outbreak scenarios and data availability levels were 
presented to participants was assigned using a random number generator such that four 
participants received the detailed summary data first and five received the CDS results 
first. Participants were given the scenarios as a stack of 30 sheets of paper, with one data 
availability level per sheet and three sheets per scenario. Each sheet included the text or 
figures for each scenario and data availability level as described above, together with 
three standard questions (Figure 5.1). The participant proceeded through the interview 
questions by flipping through the pages one sheet at a time. The minimal summary data 
was always presented first, followed by the mathematical model and detailed summary 
data in the assigned order from the randomization. Participants were told they could 
allow information on the previous one or two sheets for the same scenario to influence 








Clinical Decision Support System (CDS) 
A detailed description of the mathematical model used to generate transmission 
mode and EHA predictions in the CDS is included in Chapter 4.  
The model has been found to have sensitivity as high as 87% and specificity as 
high as 99% for outbreaks in the settings covered in this paper (Chapter 4). However, 
though it was validated on a population of outbreaks including those caused by norovirus 
and other pathogens, the model explicitly assumes norovirus as the causal pathogen and 
may not be appropriate for outbreaks caused by other pathogens. Despite this restriction 
to norovirus outbreaks and other characteristics specific to the CDS design, many of the 
study findings should still be loosely applicable to other public health decision support 
systems with similar performance and display of results. 
The importance of the model in the context of this study concerns how the data 
required to run the model, including only the case count, size of the affected population, 
number currently ill, and number of days since the first onset were all included in the 
minimal summary data provided to the study participants. Thus any comparability to 
performance based on the detailed summary data would indicate an improvement in data 
efficiency, with more or equal information obtained from fewer data. 
 
Data Analysis 
Differences by data availability level and accuracy of the assumed pathogen, 
mode of transmission, and recommendation of EHA were evaluated using generalized 
linear mixed effects models (GLMM) logistic regression to account for within-subjects 





study design was assessed by including interaction terms for the order of data level 
presentation (mathematical model data first vs. detailed summary data first) and the order 
of scenario presentation (presented in the first five scenarios vs. presented in the last five 
scenarios) to see if the inclusion of these variables significantly impacted the results. P-
values less than 0.05 were considered statistically significant. 
 
Human Participant Compliance Statement 
The Institutional Review Board at the University of Utah reviewed the procedures 




Participant Responses to Open-Ended and Scenario Questions 
Participant responses regarding outbreak investigation activities, decision-making, 
and data covered all the "epidemiologic steps of an outbreak investigation."
25
 However, 
there were several responses that gave insight into results specifically pertinent to this 
study, including pathogen identification, determining the mode of transmission, and 
deciding when to conduct an EHA.  
Participant statements indicated an assumption of norovirus until more detailed 
information is available ("Treat as if it's norovirus," "Default to noro"), and there 
appeared to be some mental shortcuts used to determine the mode of transmission ("If we 
got a confirmed Salmonella, then it would be point source," "Long number of days, so 





Decisions on when to conduct EHAs varied widely, even within participants from the 
same health department, with some recommending them very frequently ("We always 
send out EH," "Policy says we have to, because it has a kitchen," "I would let them know 
– might be time to inspect anyway") and some being much more hesitant ("Not until we 
know more," "It's always based on food handlers," "We usually wouldn't send them out 
for this"). In some cases, participants were deferential, especially for certain facilities ("I 
would offer, since it's a hospital," "Might not do an inspection if it's the last day of 
school," "It's the military, so I would only recommend it"). 
With regard to the CDS, some participants were skeptical at first ("This wouldn't 
change what I would do"), though participants seemed to become more comfortable with 
the CDS as the interview progressed ("I didn't notice the scale at first," "Okay, so it 
doesn't help with determining the pathogen," "Nice that it fits on this one"). There were 
no direct statements made about the user interface or any kind of heuristic assessment. 
 
Outbreak Scenarios 
The odds of attributing an outbreak to a pathogen other than norovirus (p = 0.03), 
of determining the mode of transmission to be point source (p = 0.04), and of conducting 
an EHA (p = 0.001) were all statistically significantly higher when participants had 
access to detailed summary data than when participants only had access to minimal 
summary data. The odds were also higher for determining the mode of transmission to be 
point source (p = 0.002) and conducting an EHA (p = 0.003) when participants had the 
CDS results, compared to the minimal summary data (Table 5.3). However, the odds of 





detailed summary data were available than when only the minimal summary data were 
available, and neither level of data was associated with the determination of the mode of 
transmission or EHA reported in the literature. Both the CDS results and the detailed 
summary data had higher odds of agreeing with the CDS-predicted mode of transmission 
(p < 0.001 and p = 0.004, respectively) and recommendation to conduct an EHA (p = 
0.003 and p = 0.03, respectively) (Table 5.4). When interaction terms were included in 
the model for scenario order and data level order, no interaction terms were statistically 
significant, and these terms were not included in the final model. 
 
Discussion 
This study identifies several important associations between data availability and 
AGE outbreak response decision-making. Outbreak investigators were more likely to 
attribute outbreaks to person-to-person transmission of norovirus and to not recommend 
an EHA when data availability was at the level of an initial report, indicating some bias 
on the part of investigators in such circumstances away from assumptions that may 
require more intensive interventions.
2
 Though investigators were more likely to take 
action with more data availability, they were not more likely to identify the same mode of 
transmission or EHA determination as reported in the literature, and they were 
significantly less likely to identify the pathogen correctly in the case of the detailed 
summary data. The pathogen misclassification may be attributable in part to an assumed 
connection between point source transmission and pathogens other than norovirus 
indicated in the participants' open-ended responses. The lack of association with reported 





detailed summary data or CDS results, such as ill food handlers or common exposures. 
This finding is consistent with the participants' open-ended responses, but the 
associations with the CDS predictions suggest that it may also be explained in part by 
possible misclassification of the outbreaks upon which the scenarios were based. Three 
outbreaks classified as person-to-person in the literature were classified as having some 
evidence of point source transmission by the CDS. 
Participants with the CDS results or detailed summary data had higher odds of 
correctly determining the CDS-predicted mode of transmission and EHA determination. 
This finding might seem intuitive, since the CDS predictions were included in the 
mathematical model results given to participants, but the order in which the participants 
received the CDS data did not significantly modify the associations. This lack of 
interaction suggests that the CDS was able to steer decision-making among participants 
in ways similar to the detailed summary data (though the effect sizes were larger for the 
CDS) while only using data that are much more likely to be available in practice. It also 
suggests that participants were similarly likely to use the CDS results as they were the 
detailed summary data for decision support, and to use them to make decisions consistent 
with the CDS predictions, even when those results had not yet been presented. This 
apparent acceptance of the CDS results is an important finding for the CDS, but it also 
has implications for the future of decision support in outbreak response. 
 
Limitations 
While participants were not randomly selected, they represented 5 of 14 health 





staff in the state. The study findings should be generalizable to similar public health 
officials in similar settings. Since the study was limited to health departments from Utah, 
results may be more useful in states with a decentralized public health infrastructure 
similar to Utah’s, though other unknown idiosyncrasies in the Utah public health system 
may exist that would make some findings applicable only to Utah. The reliability of the 
expert interviews may have been affected by the varying levels of expertise of the study 
participants and the diverse populations they serve, but since they were all active AGE 
outbreak investigators, their perceptions of decision-making during outbreaks would 
necessarily be reflective of decisions made by public health personnel in the field. 
The outbreak scenarios were also not randomly selected, but were intended to be 
representative of norovirus outbreaks in settings where the mode of transmission may not 
be easily observed, such as long-term care facilities, schools, and other institutions. 
However, it is possible that bias in the selection of outbreaks from the literature 
influenced the study findings. Also, only norovirus outbreaks were included in the 
scenarios due to the nature of the CDS used. Results may vary for outbreaks caused by 
other pathogens. However, there were no associations between the CDS results and the 
pathogen attribution or accuracy of the pathogen attribution. 
Small sample size is an important limiting factor for this study. While several 
associations were statistically significant, other potential associations may not have been 
observed due to inadequate statistical power. Increasing the number of participants or the 
number of outbreak scenarios would have improved the statistical power, but were 







This study demonstrates the impact of data availability on outbreak response, the 
potential for CDS to contribute meaningfully when data are sparse, and the acceptability 
of CDS to public health practitioners. More CDS development and research are needed in 
this area. 
 
Implications for Policy and Practice 
 Acute gastroenteritis outbreak investigators have diverse approaches to pathogen 
identification, transmission mode determination, and conducting environmental 
health assessments. 
 When only minimal data are available, acute gastroenteritis outbreak investigators 
assume reported outbreaks are caused by norovirus, are spread by person-to-
person transmission, and do not require an environmental health assessment. 
 Mathematical modeling of acute gastroenteritis outbreaks may perform similarly 
to detailed summary data (epidemic curves, symptoms, etc.) for determining the 
mode of transmission and whether to conduct environmental health assessments 
using only data that are available earlier and more often. 
 Data from decision support systems may be treated similarly to data from 










Table 5.1. Characteristics of study participants (N = 9). 
Experience (years) Median (Range) 
Public health experience (years) 10 (5-29) 
AGE epidemiology experience (years) 8 (2-20) 
   Professional characteristics Count (%) 
Supervises other staff 5 (56) 
Degree/professional license* 9 (100) 
Master of public health degree 7 (78) 
Environmental health scientist 2 (22) 
Registered nurse 1 (11) 
  Health Department size 
 Small rural LHD (pop. < 100,000, pop. density < 1000/sq. mi.) 2 (22) 
Medium urban LHD (pop. 100,000-500,000) 2 (22) 
Large urban LHD (pop. > 500,000) 3 (33) 
State health department 2 (22) 






Table 5.2. Characteristics of acute gastroenteritis outbreak scenarios (N = 
10). 
Characteristic Mean (Range) 
Case count 51.5 (18-139) 
Number exposed 314 (75-1800) 
Attack rate 0.21 (0.02-0.45) 
Outbreak duration (days) 13 (6-17) 
  Setting Count (%) 
Long-term care facility 5 (50) 
School (elementary school, university) 2 (20) 
Other healthcare setting (hospital, psychiatric center) 2 (20) 
Military training facility 1 (10) 
  Reported mode 
 Person-to-person 5 (50) 
Point source 5 (50) 
Environmental contamination 2 (20) 
Foodborne 2 (20) 
Waterborne 1 (10) 
  Reported response 
 EHA 6 (60) 
No EHA 4 (40) 
  Model-predicted mode/response 
 Point source/EHA 8 (80) 









Table 5.3. Odds ratios (OR) for participant-predicted pathogen, mode of 
transmission, and response by level of information availability (N = 90 for each). 
 





Minimal 13 77 1.0 (—) — 
Math model 16 74 1.4 (0.6-3.6) 0.47 
Detailed 23 67 2.7 (1.1-6.9) 0.03* 







Point source Person-to-person 
 
 
Minimal 39 51 1.0 (—) — 
Math model 59 31 2.8 (1.5-5.4) 0.002* 
Detailed 52 38 1.9 (1.0-3.6) 0.04* 







EHA No EHA 
 
 
Minimal 51 39 1.0 (—) — 
Math model 65 25 3.7 (1.6-9.6) 0.003* 
Detailed 67 23 4.6 (1.9-12.2) 0.001* 










Table 5.4. Odds ratios (OR) for accuracy of participant-selected pathogen, mode of 
transmission, and response compared to reported epidemiologic findings and 
mathematical model predictions by level of information availability (N = 90 for 
each). 





Minimal 77 13 1.0 (—) — 
Math model 74 16 0.7 (0.3-1.8) 0.47 
Detailed 67 23 0.4 (0.1-0.9) 0.03* 
    
 
 







Minimal 52 38 1.0 (—) — 
Math model 60 30 1.5 (0.8-2.8) 0.21 
Detailed 57 33 1.3 (0.7-2.4) 0.44 
    
 
 







Minimal 51 39 1.0 (—) — 
Math model 53 37 1.1 (0.6-2.0) 0.76 













Table 5.4 continued. 





Minimal 41 49 1.0 (—) — 
Math model 69 21 4.1 (2.2-8.0) < 0.001* 














Minimal 47 43 1.0 (—) — 
Math model 65 25 2.7 (1.4-5.4) 0.003* 
Detailed 60 30 2 (1.1-3.9) 0.03* 











Open-ended questions for each participant 
 "What specific actions would you take? Please describe a typical outbreak 
investigation in your jurisdiction from beginning to end." 
 "What decisions would you have to make? Please describe your thought processes in 
detail, including what practices and policies would impact your decision-making." 
 "What data would you need to make those decisions? What data would you usually 
expect to have available?" 
 "What other factors might influence your decision-making process?" 
Questions repeated for each outbreak scenario and data availability level for each 
participant 
 "Based on these data, do you believe that the outbreak is more likely to be caused by 
norovirus or by some other pathogen? (Norovirus/Other pathogen)" 
 "Based on these data, do you believe that the outbreak is more likely to be primarily 
caused by point source transmission or person-to-person transmission? (Point 
source/Person-to-Person)" 
 "Based on whether or not you believe there is evidence that the outbreak is caused by 
point source transmission or a pathogen other than norovirus, would you advise 
conducting an onsite environmental health assessment at this time? (Yes/No)" 












Figure 5.2. Example of decision support system results (additional background 







1. Gregg M. Field Epidemiology. 3rd ed. New York [NY]: Oxford University Press; 
2008. 
 
2. Hall A, Vinje J, Lopman B, Park G, Yen C. Updated norovirus outbreak 
management and disease prevention guidelines. MMWR Morb Mort Wkly Rep 
2011;60(RR03):1-15. 
 
3. Council to Improve Foodborne Outbreak Response (CIFOR). Guidelines for 
Foodborne Disease Outbreak Response. Atlanta [GA]: Council of State and 
Territorial Epidemiologists; 2009. 
 
4. Hall AJ, Wikswo ME, Manikonda K, Roberts VA, Yoder JS, Gould L. Acute 
gastroenteritis surveillance through the National Outbreak Reporting System, 
United States. Emerg Infect Diseases 2013;19(8):1305-9. 
 
5. NORS team. National Outbreak Reporting System (NORS) Guidance. Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention. Version 2.1. Atlanta [GA]: Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention; 2017. 
 
6. Kaplan JE, Gary GW, Baron RC, Singh N, Schonberger LB, Feldman R, et al. 
Epidemiology of Norwalk gastroenteritis and the role of Norwalk virus in 
outbreaks of acute nonbacterial gastroenteritis. Ann Intern Med 1982;96(6 Pt 
1):756-61. 
 
7. Turcios RM, Widdowson M, Sulka AC, Mead PS, Glass RI. Reevaluation of 
epidemiological criteria for identifying outbreaks of acute gastroenteritis due to 
norovirus: United States, 1998-2000. Clin Infect Diseases 2006;42(7):964-9. 
8. Domínguez A, Broner S, Torner N, Martínez A, Jansà JM, Alvarez J, et al. Utility 
of clinical-epidemiological profiles in outbreaks of foodborne disease, Catalonia, 
2002 through 2006. J Food Protect 2010;73(1):125-31. 
9. Hedberg CW, Palazzi-Churas KL, Radke VJ, Selman CA, Tauxe RV. The use of 
clinical profiles in the investigation of foodborne outbreaks in restaurants: United 
States, 1982-1997. Epidemiol Infect 2008;136(1):65-72. 
10. Verhoef LPB, Kroneman A, van Duynhoven Y, Boshuizen H, van Pelt W, 
Koopmans M. Selection tool for foodborne norovirus outbreaks. Emerg Infect 
Diseases 2009;15(1):31-8. 
11. Vynnycky E, White RG. An Introduction to Infectious Disease Modelling. New 
York [NY]: Oxford University Press; 2010. 






13. Mellou K, Sideroglou T, Potamiti-Komi M, Kokkinos P, Ziros P, 
Georgakopoulou T, et al. Epidemiological investigation of two parallel 
gastroenteritis outbreaks in school settings. BMC Public Health 2013;13:241. 
14. Ludwig A, Sato K, Schirmer P, Maniar A, Lucero-Obusan C, Fleming C, et al. 
Concurrent outbreaks with co-infection of norovirus and Clostridium difficile in a 
long-term-care facility. Epidemiol Infect 2013;141:1598-603. 
15. Lai C, Wanga Y, Wub C, Hung C, Jiang D, Wu F. A norovirus outbreak in a 
nursing home: Norovirus shedding time associated with age. J Clin Virol 
2013;56:96–101. 
16. Honish L, Talbot J, Dragon D, Utgoff D. Outbreak of norovirus gastroenteritis at 
a university student residence – Edmonton, Alberta, 2006. Can Commun Dis Rep 
Weekly 2008;34(4). 
17. de Menezes F, Correa V, Franco F, Ribeiro MI, dos Santos Cardoso MF, Morillo 
SG, et al. An outbreak of norovirus infection in a long-term care facility in Brazil. 
Einstein (Sao Paolo) 2010;8(4 Pt 1):410-3. 
18. Ohwaki K, Nagashima H, Aoki M, Aoki H, Yano E. A foodborne norovirus 
outbreak at a hospital and an attached long-term care facility. Jpn J Infect Dis 
2009; 62:450-4. 
19. Rondy M, Koopmans M, Rotsaert C, Van Loon T, Beljaars B, Van Dijk G, et al. 
Norovirus disease associated with excess mortality and use of statins: a 
retrospective cohort study of an outbreak following a pilgrimage to Lourdes. 
Epidemiol Infect 2011;139:453-63. 
20. Odelin M, Ruel N, Berthelot P, Diana M-C, Blanchon M-A, Omar S, et al. 
Investigation d’une épidémie de gastro-entérite à norovirus dans un hôpital 
gériatrique. Ann Biol Clin 2006;64(2):141-7. 
21. Cui C, Pan L, Wang Y, Xue C, Zhu W, Zhu L, et al. An outbreak of acute GII.17 
norovirus gastroenteritis in a long-term care facility in China: the role of nursing 
assistants. J Infect Public Health 2017;10(6):725-9. 
22. Ramos M, Soto G, Loayza L, Valle R, Luna G, Gonzalez S, et al. Brote de 
infección por norovirus del grupo II en un centro de entrenamiento military, Perú 
2013. Rev Peru Med Exp Salud Publica 2015;32(1):87-92. 
23. GI Initial Outbreak Report Form [Internet]. Placer County Public Health 







24. Norovirus Outbreak Summary Form: Long Term Care Facilities. Williamson 
County and Cities Health District [cited 2017 Nov]. Available from 
http://www.wcchd.org/docs/Norovirus_Outbreak_Summary_Form.pdf. 
25. Career Development Division. Principles of Epidemiology in Public Health 
Practice. 3
rd















Several important findings were uncovered through our research. First, there is an 
excessive amount of variation in state guidelines for norovirus outbreaks in healthcare 
settings, despite the release of national guidelines in 2011. This variation appears to be 
associated with outbreak outcomes, with states with guidelines that conflict with the 
national guidance having more outbreaks and higher case counts than other states. The 
amount of variation in stool specimen collection alone is an impactful finding that 
warrants a national conversation. 
The mathematical model was found to predict point source transmission with high 
levels of internal and external validity. The difference in the modes of transmission 
predicted by the model and those reported by outbreak investigators indicates the high 
potential for improved classification if public health officials used such a tool for 
decision support and seek additional information to accurately classify outbreaks. The 
potential for the model to perform well at the beginning of an outbreak gives 
investigators the opportunity to make evidence-based decisions earlier and more 





with person-to-person transmission further suggests that the model would be useful for 
triage in distinguishing between outbreaks likely caused by point source transmission 
from those that are not. These findings are important for the field of applied 
epidemiology. 
Finally, the epidemiologist interviews confirmed the diversity in responses when 
only limited data are available, with participants more likely to assume norovirus, person-
to-person transmission, and not conduct an EHA when only minimal summary data were 
available. These findings suggest that many of an outbreak investigator's first decisions 
may be based more on predisposition and experience than on the data at hand. This 
opportunity to better leverage initial data supports the importance of CDS to help 
improve those early decisions, guide information gathering, and ultimately prevent more 
illness in the community. The lack of an interaction based on the type of detailed 
information presented (traditional or CDS) further supported the potential for CDS to 
play an increased role in outbreak response. This potential was confirmed by the ability 
of the CDS to perform similarly to traditional data based on much less information than 
would likely be available earlier in the outbreak. The potential was also confirmed by the 
similarity between participants' use of traditional data and the CDS results, suggesting the 
acceptability of CDS data to current practitioners. 
Altogether, this dissertation research supported the growing importance of CDS in 
public health practice. Complicated policies, missing information, and investigator 
predispositions necessitate the development and application of ever-more-sophisticated 






Uniqueness/Significance to Biomedical Informatics 
The research we performed applied mathematical modeling techniques to an 
important use case in applied public health, and no similar studies were readily found in 
the literature. Outbreak management is a focus area of public health informatics,
1
 and the 
proposed research aimed to contribute meaningfully to the management of acute 
gastroenteritis outbreaks, which constitute a sizeable portion of the public health burden 
caused by outbreaks. Similar methods can be used in the management of other 
communicable disease outbreaks, such as respiratory outbreaks or contagious skin 
conditions. Though this mathematical modeling approach could be useful in a variety of 
settings at different levels of government, this research is intended to be implemented 
where it would be most impactful – at the local health department level where actions 
first occur in response to outbreaks. The validation of the model against national data and 
the evaluation of the model as it is implemented in local health departments could further 
enable the results to have a broader impact as they are intended to be generalizable and 
portable to health departments across the country. 
 
Future Directions 
The results of the research we undertook are promising, but preliminary. Much 
remains to be understood about each of the research areas, and there are great 
opportunities for further work. 
The next steps regarding variation in state guidelines covered efforts to better 
understand how local jurisdictions develop guidelines and to re-emphasize the 





understand the relationship between the guidelines and the disparities in outbreak 
outcomes that were observed. Efforts need to be made to investigate if these associations 
remain after potential confounders are accounted for, and the causality of any remaining 
associations needs to be assessed. The potential for adjustments to the national guidelines 
should be explored, or even the potential impact of developing guidelines on how to 
develop guidelines or enhance national guidelines based on local outcomes. 
With regard to the mathematical model, there is a similarly wide range of 
opportunities for continued research. The validation of the model was limited by the data 
available, but richer data could lead to more robust conclusions about the effectiveness of 
the model. It could also enable improved evaluation of the settings for which the model is 
most accurate. There could also be modifications to the model itself. The model was 
simple by design, but the incorporation of more complicated techniques to further 
optimize limited data has great potential to further improve the results. More 
sophisticated simulations, perhaps at the agent level, could likewise make the results 
more generalizable to the affected population and thus more accurate and useful. 
The outbreak scenarios were conducted due to the inability to collect adequate 
real-world data to see how epidemiologists actually functioned in practice, which is an 
important limitation of the study we conducted. The real-world impact of data availability 
on outbreak response is still unknown, and our results only loosely approximated what 
that impact would be. Collecting and analyzing real-world data would help to clarify how 
these decisions are made in practice, and how data, or the lack thereof, may bias the 
results. The impact of CDS on decision-making should likewise be explored, and is 
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW TEXT 
 
Interview Introductory Text 
Hello ______________, 
The purpose of this study is to better understand the decision-making processes 
followed by public health officials during acute gastroenteritis (AGE) outbreaks. Please 
reflect upon your own experience as an AGE outbreak investigator as you respond to the 
following questions. 
Consider the following scenario:  
You receive a call from a concerned resident reporting an outbreak of acute 
gastroenteritis. 
(Q1) What specific actions would you take? Please describe a typical outbreak 
investigation in your jurisdiction from beginning to end. 
(Q2) What decisions would you have to make? Please describe your thought 
processes in detail, including what practices and policies would impact your decision-
making. 
(Q3) What data would you need to make those decisions? What data would you 
usually expect to have available? 
(Q4) What other factors might influence your decision-making process? 
Now you’ll be asked to consider some scenarios with data provided from real 





minimal data, equivalent to basic information that might be reported on an initial 
telephone report of an outbreak; full data, including summary information based on 
detailed case-level interviews from the outbreak; and results from a mathematical model 
that simulates the outbreaks and predicts whether the observed case counts are consistent 
with person-to-person transmission of norovirus. The model has been found to have 87% 
sensitivity and an estimated specificity of nearly 100%. The statistical tests used are two-
tailed, meaning that statistical significance is indicated when p-values are less than 0.025. 
Please consider the provided information and describe how you would respond to 
each outbreak if it occurred in your jurisdiction. You may consider previous levels of 
data that pertain to the same outbreak in your decisions. Describe your initial impressions 
and what interventions you would implement, including the likely mode of transmission 
and whether or not you would conduct an onsite environmental health assessment. For 
the purposes of this study, an outbreak is considered to have a point source if any 
transmission other than person-to-person occurred, and an environmental health 
assessment is defined as any in-person visit by environmental health staff related to the 
outbreak investigation. Please don’t try to guess what the actual pathogens or modes of 
transmission are. Just respond as you would normally if these outbreaks occurred as part 







You receive a phone call from an elementary school nurse. He tells you there are 51 ill 
students out of 113 students in the affected grades (attack rate = 45%). There were 2 
initial cases, and there have been 7 days since they first became ill. There are 3 children 
currently ill. No food handlers are known to have been ill, and there are no other known 
common exposures. 
Figure A.1. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=8346). 
 
Table A.1. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=8346). 
Kaplan Criteria for determining if an outbreak 




Mean (or median) illness duration of 12 to 60 
hours 
Median illness duration = 48 hours 
Mean (or median) incubation period of 24 to 48 
hours 
Incubation period = unknown 
More than 50% of cases with vomiting 77% of cases with vomiting 
No bacterial agent found No bacterial agent found 
1





























































You receive a phone call from a nursing home administrator. He tells you there are 25 ill 
residents out of 195 total in the facility (attack rate = 13%) and 29 ill staff out of 97 total 
in the facility (attack rate = 30%). There were 2 initial cases, and it has been 19 days 
since they first became ill. There is 1 resident currently ill. No food handlers are known 
to have been ill, and there are no other known common exposures. 
Figure A.4. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=8276). 
 
Table A.2. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=8276). 
Kaplan Criteria for determining if an outbreak 




Mean (or median) illness duration of 12 to 60 
hours 
Median illness duration = unknown 
Mean (or median) incubation period of 24 to 48 
hours 
Incubation period = unknown 
More than 50% of cases with vomiting 23% of cases with vomiting 
No bacterial agent found C. difficile isolated 
1
































































You receive a phone call from a nursing home nurse supervisor. She tells you there are 
12 ill residents out of 42 total in the facility (attack rate = 29%) and 6 ill staff out of 33 
total in the facility (attack rate = 18%). It has been 6 days since the first resident became 
ill, and there are 7 residents and staff currently ill. No food handlers are known to have 
been ill, and there are no other known common exposures. 
Figure A.7. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=4158). 
 
Table A.3. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=4158). 
Kaplan Criteria for determining if an outbreak 




Mean (or median) illness duration of 12 to 60 
hours 
Mean illness duration = 2.1 days 
Mean (or median) incubation period of 24 to 48 
hours 
Incubation period = unknown 
More than 50% of cases with vomiting 79% of cases with vomiting 
No bacterial agent found No bacterial agent found 
1






























































You receive a phone call from a university administrator. She tells you there are 43 ill 
students out of about 1800 total at the school (attack rate = 2%). It has been 17 days since 
the first resident became ill, and there are 3 students currently ill. No food handlers are 
known to have been ill, and there are no other known common exposures. 
Figure A.10. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=7020). 
 
Table A.4. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=7020). 
Kaplan Criteria for determining if an outbreak 




Mean (or median) illness duration of 12 to 60 
hours 
Median illness duration = 48 hours 
Mean (or median) incubation period of 24 to 48 
hours 
Incubation period = unknown 
More than 50% of cases with vomiting 37% of cases with vomiting 
No bacterial agent found No bacterial agent found 
1





























































You receive a phone call from a nursing home manager. He tells you there are 41 ill 
residents out of 150 total in the facility (attack rate = 27%) and 24 ill staff out of 40 total 
in the facility (attack rate = 60%). It has been 12 days since the first resident became ill, 
and there are 2 residents and staff currently ill. No food handlers are known to have been 
ill, and there are no other known common exposures. 
Figure A.13. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=1722). 
 
Table A.5. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=1722). 
Kaplan Criteria for determining if an outbreak 




Mean (or median) illness duration of 12 to 60 
hours 
Median illness duration = 1 day 
Mean (or median) incubation period of 24 to 48 
hours 
Incubation period = unknown 
More than 50% of cases with vomiting 50.4% of cases with vomiting 
No bacterial agent found No bacterial agent found 
1



























































You receive a phone call from the infection preventionist (IP) at a local hospital. He tells 
you there are 81 ill patients out of 413 total in the facility (attack rate = 20%) and 58 ill 
staff out of 285 total in the facility (attack rate = 20%). There were 2 initial cases, it has 
been 7 days since they first became ill, and there are 5 residents and staff currently ill. No 
food handlers are known to have been ill, and there are no other known common 
exposures. 
Figure A.16. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=6041). 
 
Table A.6. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=6041). 
Kaplan Criteria for determining if an outbreak 




Mean (or median) illness duration of 12 to 60 
hours 
Median illness duration = unknown 
Mean (or median) incubation period of 24 to 48 
hours 
Incubation period = unknown 
More than 50% of cases with vomiting 62% of patients with vomiting, 57% 
of staff with vomiting 
No bacterial agent found No bacterial agent found 
1



























































You receive a phone call from a psychiatric center administrator. She tells you there are 
19 ill residents out of 60 total in the facility (attack rate = 32%) and 4 ill staff out of 49 
total in the facility (attack rate = 8%). It has been 17 days since the first resident became 
ill, and there are no residents or staff currently ill. No food handlers are known to have 
been ill, and there are no other known common exposures. 
Figure A.19. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=5438). 
 
Table A.7. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=5438). 
Kaplan Criteria for determining if an outbreak 




Mean (or median) illness duration of 12 to 60 
hours 
Median illness duration = 3 days for 
patients, unknown for staff 
Mean (or median) incubation period of 24 to 48 
hours 
Incubation period = unknown 
More than 50% of cases with vomiting 48% of patients with vomiting, 
unknown for staff 
No bacterial agent found No bacterial agent found 
1


























































You receive a phone call from a nursing home administrator. She tells you there are 43 ill 
residents out of 182 total in the facility (attack rate = 24%) and 9 ill staff out of 154 total 
in the facility (attack rate = 6%). It has been 17 days since the first resident became ill, 
and there are 8 residents and staff currently ill. No food handlers are known to have been 
ill, and there are no other known common exposures. 
Figure A.22. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=4474). 
 
Table A.8. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=4474). 
Kaplan Criteria for determining if an outbreak 




Mean (or median) illness duration of 12 to 60 
hours 
Mean illness duration = 48 hours 
among healthcare workers 
Mean (or median) incubation period of 24 to 48 
hours 
Incubation period = unknown 
More than 50% of cases with vomiting 64% of healthcare workers with 
vomiting 
No bacterial agent found No bacterial agent found 
1



























































You receive a phone call from a nursing home nurse supervisor. She tells you there are 
15 ill residents out of 295 total in the facility (attack rate = 5%) and 7 ill staff out of 65 
total in the facility (attack rate = 11%). There were 2 initial cases, it has been 6 days since 
they first became ill, and there are no residents or staff currently ill. No food handlers are 
known to have been ill, and there are no other known common exposures. 
Figure A.25. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=5897). 
 
Table A.9. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=5897). 
Kaplan Criteria for determining if an outbreak 




Mean (or median) illness duration of 12 to 60 
hours 
Median illness duration = unknown 
Mean (or median) incubation period of 24 to 48 
hours 
Incubation period = unknown 
More than 50% of cases with vomiting 41% of cases with vomiting 
No bacterial agent found No bacterial agent found 
1



























































You receive a phone call from an officer at a military training facility. He tells you there 
are 121 ill personnel out of 363 total in the facility (attack rate = 33%). It has been 14 
days since the first case became ill, and there are 7 personnel currently ill. No food 
handlers are known to have been ill, and there are no other known common exposures. 
Figure A.28. Minimal Data (Scenario ID=1919). 
 
Table A.10. Kaplan's Criteria (Scenario ID=1919). 
Kaplan Criteria for determining if an outbreak 




Mean (or median) illness duration of 12 to 60 
hours 
Median illness duration = 48 hours 
Mean (or median) incubation period of 24 to 48 
hours 
Incubation period = unknown 
More than 50% of cases with vomiting 34% of cases with vomiting 
No bacterial agent found No bacterial agent found 
1





















































Figure A.30. Clinical Decision Support Results (Scenario ID=1919). 
